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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article initially explores our society’s powerful, naturally 
evolved passion for sports competition, the history of this cultural 
phenomenon as applied to intercollegiate athletics, and the role of big-
time, commercialized intercollegiate athletics within the twenty-first
century American university.  The United States marketplace responds 
to cultural forces and strong public demand for popular products; the 
commercialization of college sports directly reflects the marketplace 
realities of our society.
There is substantial public interest in interscholastic sports.  Although
men’s basketball and football are generally popular with the public, 
there is a heightened level of interest in the Division I Football Bowl
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Subdivision (FBS), formerly known as “Division I-A.”  In response, 
colleges and universities invest substantial resources in their athletic 
departments as a means to achieve a wide range of legitimate objectives 
that further their missions.  Among these objectives are providing a lens 
through which the nature, scope, and quality of their higher educational 
services is discovered by the public; attracting high quality faculty,
students, and student-athletes; diversifying their student bodies; forging
a continuing bond with alumni, the local community, and other 
constituents that provides both tangible and intangible benefits; and 
enhancing their institutional reputations. 
This Article will then explain why university athletic department
revenues should continue to be exempt from federal taxation, specifically
the Federal Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT), despite the
increasingly commercialized nature of intercollegiate sports such as 
Division I FBS football and men’s basketball.  Moreover, proposed 
revision of federal tax law is not an effective means of preventing 
marketplace forces from pushing intercollegiate athletics out of its
proper role as an integral part of nonprofit higher education and into a 
primarily commercial endeavor nearly identical to for-profit professional
sports. 
Recognizing that the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics 
creates economic incentives for conduct that may conflict with a 
university’s academic mission and may potentially exploit student-athletes, 
this Article proposes that Congress provide the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) and its member universities with a conditional 
exemption from the federal antitrust laws.  This limited antitrust immunity
would enable the NCAA to enact legislation to ensure that intercollegiate
athletics are primarily educational endeavors, prevent the excessive
allocation of university financial resources to sports, and better enable 
student-athletes in revenue-generating sports to obtain the educational
benefits of their bargain.  In addition, this proposal has the potential to
protect and maintain the opportunity for student-athletes to participate in 
sports that do not generate net revenue. 
II. PRIMAL AND CULTURAL FORCES UNDERLYING
AMERICAN SPORTS COMPETITION 
Persuasive evidence shows that youthful sports competition reflects an 
inherent, survival-based, and pleasure-producing dynamic that has evolved 
within human nature.  In turn, human culture—including our educational 
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systems—is profoundly influenced by this dynamic.  Culture, in turn, 
creates consumer demands that are reflected in the economic workings 
of a free marketplace.  The entire history of intercollegiate sports
demonstrates this interrelationship.  In short, the structure of America’s
intercollegiate athletics derives from evolved human nature and is 
powerfully influenced by the resulting cultural manifestations and their 
impact on the marketplace.  These interlocked forces will be briefly
examined. 
Current neurology and psychology research indicate that human play 
is an inherent, joy-producing essential of our species.  Play is seen as an 
imperative, evolved, natural survival element inherent in humans and
certain other mammals.1  Researchers conclude that play is an essential 
natural selection step that equips people for survival as members of 
human society.2  As summarized by one leading psychiatrist-neurologist 
researcher: “[R]esearch suggests that play is a biological necessity . . . . 
[T]he forces that initiate play lie in the ancient survival centers of the 
brain . . . where other anciently preserved survival capacities also reside.”3 
The survival tools produced by play include human empathy, trust in
others, complex problem solving, knowledge of both personal and 
interpersonal boundaries, and humor.4 
1. Interview with Dr. Stuart Brown, M.D., Founder, Nat’l Inst. for Play,
http://www.amazon.com/Play-Shapes-Brain-Imagination-Invigorates/dp/1583333339/ref=s 
(reviewing Dr. Brown’s latest publication); see also STUART BROWN WITH CHRISTOPHER
VAUGHN, PLAY: HOW IT SHAPES THE BRAIN, OPENS THE IMAGINATION, AND INVIGORATES
THE SOUL 5–7, 15–50 (2009).  Brown, former Chief of Psychiatry at Mercy Hospital, left
clinical practice to found the National Institute for Play.  About Us, NAT’L INST. FOR 
PLAY, http://www.nifplay.org/about_us.html (last visited July 29, 2010) (chronicling the 
career of Dr. Stuart Brown, founder of the National Institute for Play); Interview by
Krista Tippett with Dr. Stuart Brown, Founder, Nat’l Inst. for Play (July 2, 2009), 
http://speakingoffaith.publicradio.org/programs/play/ (discussing Dr. Brown’s neurological 
and psychological studies).  The underlying dynamic of Dr. Brown’s findings may be
partially explained by the “collective unconscious” theories of C.G. Jung and his theories
of archetypes.  Jung speculated that repeated human experiences throughout the course
of history create a sort of psychological inheritance of our species. See generally Anthony
Stevens, The Archetypes, in  THE HANDBOOK OF JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY,
PRACTICE AND APPLICATIONS, 74, 74–93 (Renos K. Papadopoulos ed., 2006).  Whatever 
the root theoretical explanation for Dr. Brown’s observations of human play, ordinary
human experience confirms them vividly among youth.
2. Interview by Krista Tippett with Dr. Stuart Brown, supra note 1.
3. Id.
 4. Id.  Researcher/psychologist Dr. Stuart Brown, studying large numbers of 
convicted male murderers, found this startling commonality: one hundred percent of the 
murderers he studied had never learned to play in their youth.  Id.  This discovery
launched Dr. Brown into a decades-long study of play.  See About Us, supra note 1.  Dr.
Brown’s conclusions are significant to understanding the deep grip that sports 
competition has on our species.  Interview by Krista Tippett with Dr. Stuart Brown, 
supra note 1; see also  JAMES E. JOHNSON ET AL., PLAY AND EARLY CHILDHOOD
DEVELOPMENT 7, 11, 16–17 (2d ed. 1999) (asserting that the motivation for play and play
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Researchers of human behavior confirm that “[c]ompetitiveness is a 
product of the cumulative experience of the human race.”5  American
athletics history demonstrates that humanity’s youthful energy and the 
need to compete gave rise to public athletic competitions and was part of 
the robustness of America’s settlers.  For instance, a youthful Abraham 
Lincoln first became noted for his strength and athletic ability in frontier 
Indiana wrestling contests.6  This same grassroots energy seemingly led 
to America’s original interscholastic competitions, as when Harvard and 
Yale students created 1852’s first rowing competition,7 followed by 
Princeton and Rutgers students’ introducing intercampus college football 
games.8  Full-time coaches, formal institutional recognition, big stadiums, 
widespread sports merchandising, megamedia, and all the rest of today’s 
sports culture evolved in later decades until we found urban and suburban 
America bursting with youthful competition and sports.9 
activities, such as sports, “comes from within the individual” and that these activities are 
“pursued for their own sake”).
 5. Walter Bonime, Competitiveness and Human Potential, 14 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHOANALYSIS 149, 153 (1986); see also Kingsley R. Browne, Women in Science:
Biological Factors Should Not Be Ignored, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 509, 514–15 
(2005); Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on 
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1368–69
(1997); Craig Holt, Competitive Fishing Really Serves Purpose, HERALD-SUN (Durham, 
N.C.), Aug. 13, 1995, at D9. 
 6. Ira Berkow, Honest, Abe Had Athletic Ability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1987, at 
B29; see also  RONALD C. WHITE, JR., A. LINCOLN: A BIOGRAPHY 47 (2009); Hastert, 
Wellstone Named to Wrestling Hall of Fame, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 2000, at C2 (“[The 
National Wrestling Hall of Fame] recognizes former wrestlers who have achieved 
national or international acclaim in their careers.  Among the other 32 inductees are 
former U.S. Presidents George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, William H. Taft and 
Teddy Roosevelt . . . .”). 
 7. Joanna Davenport, From Crew to Commercialism—The Paradox of Sport in
Higher Education, in SPORTS AND THE LAW: A MODERN ANTHOLOGY 218, 218 (Timothy
Davis et al. eds., 1999). 
8. Id.
9. It does not take the decades of Dr. Stuart Brown’s studies of play to confirm 
this.  Anyone observing youthful athletic competitions can confirm the premise that
competition in youthful sports is not an activity imposed on us by our culture but arises 
within our species as an inherent natural drive.  One can readily observe clusters of 
preschoolers romping in public parks; stickballers on neighborhood city streets; kids 
racing wildly on primary school playgrounds; neighborhood hoopsters scrambling for
rebounds around a million nets; and rural teens with gloves, mitts, and baseballs on 
grassy fields every spring.  One can watch prepubescent boys and girls practicing soccer’s
darting teamwork on well-coached suburban teams from coast-to-coast or squads of ten-
year-olds struggling to learn game techniques in their Pop Warner football leagues. See, 
e.g., Laura Hilgers, Youth Sports Drawing More than Ever, CNN.COM (July 5, 2006, 
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The mere existence of competitive intercollegiate teams seems a 
natural extension of youthful competition.  As the Knight Commission
on Intercollegiate Athletics recently reported, one university president,
referring to competitive sports, stated, “It’s an integral part of our 
DNA. . . .  It has shaped us since our founding.”10  Athletics energizes 
both those who compete and those who are spectators to the competition, 
be they competitors or former competitors themselves, their families,
friends, loyal alumni, nonalumni supporters, sport enthusiasts on the 
faculty, and each of these groups’ varying social networks.  The 
undeniable magnetism of interscholastic sports competition has been
analogized to “85,000 people gathered for a family reunion.”11 
Regardless of whether someone celebrates this human attraction to 
competition or condemns it as a barrier to a more utopian ideal based on
sharing and cooperation, this much is clear: no realist can deny the 
presence in our species of a primal need to compete physically or
witness such competitions.12  As ever, human culture responds to human
needs and, in a free system, the marketplace responds by satisfying 
culture’s demands.  In the twenty-first century marketplace, interscholastic
sports competition has become “a multibillion dollar industry.”13 
In analyzing the bonds between a community and its sports teams, 
some commentators have pointed out that a core of tribalism is the 
12:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/07/03/rise.kids.sports/index.html (estimating 
that forty-one million American kids are involved in competitive youth sports each year).  
The educational and maturational values of competitive athletics at the junior and senior 
high school levels in America are attested to by both personal anecdotal testimony and 
empirical studies.  The educational and maturational losses to young people—whether 
star athletes or benchwarmers—from deleting competitive athletics from the schools is 
exceeded only by the tragic social costs of such loss. See Jim Souhan, Prep Activities’ 
Real Cost Appears When They’re Gone, STARTRIBUNE.COM (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.)
(May 17, 2008), http://www.startribune.com/templates/Print_This_Story?sid=19033899 
(citing studies that weigh these social costs found in NAT’L FED’N STATE HIGH SCH.
ASS’NS, THE CASE FOR HIGH SCHOOL ACTIVITIES (2008), available at http://www.nfhs.
org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=3263). 
 10. KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, QUANTITATIVE AND
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH WITH FOOTBALL BOWL SUBDIVISION UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS ON
THE COSTS AND FINANCING OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: REPORT OF FINDINGS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 43 (2009), available at http://www.knightcommissionmedia.org/imag
es/President_Survey_FINAL.pdf. 
11. Id.  “Competitiveness is a product of the cumulative experience of the human
race.”  Bonime, supra note 5, at 153; see also Browne, supra note 5, at 515; Daicoff,
supra note 5, at 1368–69; Holt, supra note 5, at D9.  For a potential Jungian explanation
of the eons-old duration of human fascination with sport, see supra note 1. 
12. See generally Bonime, supra note 5, at 149–66 (“[C]ompetitiveness is a 
product of the cumulative experience of the human race.”); Browne, supra note 5, at 
515; Daicoff, supra note 5, at 1368–69; Holt, supra note 5, at D9.
 13. MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS 13–14, 237 (2d ed. 2009). 
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energizing bond between a team and its community.14 One politically
astute observer, former Missouri Senator John Danforth, believes that a 
“sports team is different from the normal business. . . .  A sports team
carries with it the support of the community, the identity of the 
community, and the spirit of the community.”15  Similarly, judges have
recognized this bond between a community and its local sports teams.16 
One court has stated that the community’s bond to its athletic teams “[is] 
the highly valued, intangible benefits” that are virtually impossible to
 14. John Beisner, Sports Franchise Relocation: Competitive Markets and Taxpayer
Protection, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 429, 437–38 (1988).  Although Beisner deals with 
the cultural bond between a city and its professional sports teams, the bonding principle 
seems equally apt for big-time college sports.  Charles Davidson, Sports Still Draw Fans 
Despite Recession, 11 ECONSOUTH, no. 3, 2009, http://www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/econsouth/
econsouth_vol_11_no_3_sports_draw_fans.cfm?redirected=true; Ivan Maisel, Passion,
Tradition Elevate College Football over NFL, ESPN.COM (last updated Aug. 15, 2006, 
3:16 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2549750&type=Columnist&images 
Print=off; see also Kristen Martinez, Pigskin Religion, CULTURE SHOCK!, http://web.mit. 
edu/cultureshock/fa2006/www/essays/football.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2010) (“I know
most of the fans that have season tickets reasonably well because there is such a strong
sense of community among the fans and we have such a great time at the games.  We
look forward to seeing each other at the home games to discuss the referees, players and 
rivalries.  Rivalries in college football can tear apart relationships, friendships, neighborhoods 
and cities.”).
15. Daniel S. York, Note, The Professional Sports Community Protection Act:
Congress’ Best Response to Raiders?, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 345, 355 (1987) (citation
omitted).  Wisconsin Representative Marlin Schneider has stated: “Without the Milwaukee
Brewers, Bucks and Packers, [Wisconsin] ain’t nothing but another Nebraska.”  Oscar
Dixon & Mike Dodd, Brewers’ Stadium Bill Stirs Response, USA TODAY, Sept. 29,
1995, at 3C.  See generally Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, New Remedies for 
Breach of Sports Facilities Use Agreements: Time for Marketplace Realism, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 809, 811 (2003) [hereinafter Mitten & Burton, New Remedies for Breach of Sports 
Facilities Use Agreements]; Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports 
Franchise Relocations from Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing 
Marketplace Competition, League Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56
MD. L. REV. 57, 58 (1997) [hereinafter Mitten & Burton, Professional Sports Franchise 
Relocations from Private Law and Public Law Perspectives].
16. See, e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL (Raiders I), 726 F.2d 1381, 
1396–97 (9th Cir. 1984); Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n v. Minn. Twins P’ship, 638 
N.W.2d 214, 221–22 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (describing a professional MLB team’s 
bonds to its community and holding that there exists a cluster of intangible values
associated with a community’s sports teams—welfare, recreation, prestige, prosperity, 
and trade and commerce).
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quantify.17  In college athletics, the relevant community that is emotionally
bonded to the team includes more than a dozen overlapping constituencies.18 
III. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF BIG-TIME    
INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORTS 
A brief historical review illustrates that the interlocking competition-
culture-marketplace dynamic has driven the trajectory of intercollegiate 
sports from their inception in 1852 to the present.  Briefly examining the 
principal cycles in the evolution of American intercollegiate athletics 
will help to clarify this Article’s central proposition: elemental forces of 
human nature create cultural desires, which are quickly satisfied by the
creation of products and services through the operation of a free 
marketplace.  This ongoing dynamic creates powerful economic forces 
with corresponding commercial incentives that generate the potential for 
social and political conflicts, as well as abuses.  The evolution, growth, 
and commercialization of intercollegiate athletics—with the predictable
conflicts and abuses—is a paradigmatic example of these cultural and 
marketplace phenomena in action. 
Athletic competition among American institutions of higher education 
was, from an early date, based on the British rhetoric of “amateurism”— 
the ideal of uncompensated competitive sport for its own sake.
Uncompensated competition was erroneously viewed as the nature of 
athletic competition in ancient Greece.  This did not reflect reality 
because successful Greek athletes were paid substantial sums of money
17. See Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n, 638 N.W.2d at 225 (quoting Mitten & 
Burton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocations from Private Law and Public Law
Perspectives, supra note 15, at 70–71). 
18. Such multiple constituencies would include such groups—many of them
holding powerful influence or vested, legally protected rights—as taxpayers; players; 
fans; alumni; faculty; local, state, and federal politicians; university administrators; 
sports facility bond underwriters and other private or public debt holders; long-term
licensees; contract-holding suppliers and manufacturers; holders of facility naming 
rights; big media; the NCAA; athletic conferences; university coaches; federal politicians; 
parents of players; the professional sports leagues; high school players; and agents.  For
a discussion of the constituencies of a university’s interscholastic sports competition, see
KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, COLLEGE SPORTS 101: A PRIMER ON 
MONEY, ATHLETICS, AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.knightcommission.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=34
4&Itemid=84; also Bill Haisten, OSU Gets $165 Million: Holdenville Native Boone 
Pickens’ Gift to the School’s Athletic Department Is Believed To Be a U.S. Record, 
TULSA WORLD, Jan. 11, 2006, at A1 (reporting that noted financier Boone Pickens, alumni of
Oklahoma State University, has given $165 million to the school’s athletic department, 
the “largest single donation ever to an American university’s athletic department”); Martinez,
supra note 14 (describing her personal experience as a sports fan and the “strong sense 
of community” that has accompanied it).
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for their efforts.19  Nevertheless, this historically mistaken notion of 
amateurism became the hallmark of elite British universities, such as 
Cambridge and Oxford, and flourished by reason of English society’s 
rigid class distinctions and culture of elitism.20 
However, British elitist practices were not effectuated in America, as 
illustrated by the fact that Harvard rowing teams from the 1850s onward 
were awarded money for successful efforts.21  Universities’ intense 
recruiting of team members, along with the direct or indirect awarding of 
benefits to athletes, quickly became the hallmark of American intercollegiate 
sports.22  Subsequent commonplace practices such as awarding athletic 
scholarships covering the costs of student-athletes’ tuition, room, board, 
and books that are worth thousands of dollars; hiring professional
coaches—including multi-million dollar salaries for Division I FBS and
 19. Kenneth L. Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of Sport: Amateurism and 
Compensation, in SPORTS AND THE LAW: A MODERN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 7, at 223, 
224.  Greek athletes were generously rewarded: in one event the prize could be up to ten 
years worth of wages. Id.
20. See Cara Turano, The Rise of Intercollegiate Football and Its Portrayal in
American Popular Literature, UNIV. GA. J. UNDERGRADUATE RES. OPPORTUNITIES, 2001, 
http://www.uga.edu/juro/2001/Turano.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). 
21. Harvard rowers’ prizes ranged from $100 to $500, significant sums in 
nineteenth century America.  Shropshire, supra note 19, at 226.  The final U.S. stronghold of
the Anglophile ideal of amateurism in America was the Olympic teams and the
amateurism policies of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Amateur 
Athletic Union (AAU), which notoriously stripped Jim Thorpe of his two track and field 
Olympic gold medals in 1913 for playing summertime semiprofessional baseball in the 
East Carolina League.  A more realistic IOC posthumously restored Thorpe’s medals seventy
years later. Biography, JIM THORPE: WORLD’S GREATEST ATHLETE, http://www.cmgww.
com/sports/thorpe/bio.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). 
22. See generally W. Burlette Carter, The Age of Innocence: The First 25 Years of 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1906 to 1931, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
211, 230–35 (2006); Craig Lambert, The Professionalization of Ivy League Sports, 
HARVARD MAG., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 36, 36, available at http://harvardmagazine.com/
1997/09/ivy.html.  In America the rhetoric of “amateurism”—like the educational satire 
of “fish-grabbing-with-the-bare-hands”—is a nonfunctioning, cultural residue of a fictional 
past ideal. See generally J. ABNER PEDDIWELL, THE SABER-TOOTH CURRICULUM 54–74 
(memorial ed. 1972).  One radical faculty member ranted: “‘But, damn it . . . how can 
any person with good sense be interested in such useless activities?’”  Id. at 72.  This 
satire on the development of modern-day educational curricula surprisingly sheds a great 
deal of light on the current situation of college athletics in twenty-first century academe.
See id. at 54–74.  Peddiwell’s book makes the case that the enduring romance of Paleolithic 
concepts, possibly valid for human society in a long past era, if ever, continue undiminished 
after the realities of actual life experience have rendered such concepts moot.  See id.  Is
this not exactly on point with the continuing ideology of antiinterscholastic athletics, and
its accompanying myth of amateurism, which has persisted for scores of decades after
the marketplace has embraced and assimilated big-time sports into the culture? 
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men’s basketball teams—and athletic trainers; recruiting talented athletes;
and generating multimillion dollars revenues from gate receipts, broadcast
revenues, and sponsorships are notable features of the commercialization 
of American intercollegiate athletics. Such features belie the characterization 
of American intercollegiate sports as amateur sports competition. 
Reform of abuses seemingly inherent in sports competition among 
American universities reveals a series of historic landmarks.  These
landmarks clearly show that popular demand in the marketplace has 
always fueled the growth and destiny of intercollegiate athletics and
reform efforts were never targeted at abolishing competition.  Reform 
efforts illustrate society’s continuing struggle to blunt and channel the 
negative side effects of marketplace demands while still permitting 
popular athletic competitions to flourish.23  Because the 1890s saw football 
teams from prominent universities competing before grandstands packed
with student and alumni supporters, excesses and abuses—including 
brawls—arose.24  This led to the famed Chicago Meeting in January 1895 
that sought better institutional control of intercollegiate sports.  The meeting 
resulted in the formation of the Big Ten as a major college athletic 
conference to control and regulate the burgeoning popularity of intercollegiate 
sports events in the Midwest among its member institutions.25 
Despite the growth of academic conferences and increased regulation 
and institutional supervision of intercollegiate athletics, serious college 
football injuries and deaths rocketed to alarming proportions.26  President 
Theodore Roosevelt responded by meeting with Ivy League institutions 
to urge decisive action,27 and in December 1905, the representatives of
sixty-two major institutions met to form the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association of the United States (IAAUS), the predecessor to the NCAA.28 
The nascent NCAA became a rulemaking group that promoted the growth
of athletic conferences, pushed for greater institutional control of
23. For a generalized history of college and university sports in America, see 
KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 18, at 6–8. 
24. See Davenport, supra note 7, at 219. 
25. Id.  Ironically, the University of Chicago, instrumental in forming the Big Ten,
eventually dropped football and left the Big Ten, only to experience a later chapter of 
Chicago football reborn. See infra note 47. 
26. See Willie T. Smith III, Tribute to Flying Wedge a Starting Point for NCAA’s 
Hall, USA TODAY, Mar. 30, 2000, at 7C; Skip Wood, Life on Wedge: “No Room for 
Cowards,” USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 2005, at 3C. 
 27. Carter, supra note 22, at 215–16; Mark Alesia, Historians Debate Roosevelt’s
NCAA Legacy; President Played Key Role in Birth of Organization, but 1905 
“Ultimatum” Questioned, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 7, 2006, at 1D; see also The History 
of the NCAA, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=1354 (last visited
Aug. 1, 2010) (“President Theodore Roosevelt summoned college athletics leaders to 
two White House conferences to encourage such reforms.”).
 28. Alesia, supra note 27, at 1D; The History of the NCAA, supra note 27.
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intercollegiate sports, and provided a continuing national focal point for 
discussing problems periodically arising from big-time sports competition. 
These developments established the NCAA’s position within academe’s 
democratic process.29 
In the 1920s, guided by the NCAA and the booming growth of
intercollegiate sports competition and athletic conferences, American
institutions of higher education eventually came to recognize intercollegiate 
athletics as a formal part of their educational mission.  More importantly,
institutions placed athletic governance into physical education departments 
and thereby, at least nominally, under university control.30  Simultaneously, 
the linkage between alumni and the institution, including the institutional 
thirst for direct financial support from alumni, became increasingly
linked to many universities’ intercollegiate sports programs.31 
The stock market crash of 1929 coincided with the release of the 
Carnegie Report, which summarized the findings of its multiyear project
examining the nature of intercollegiate athletics and the relationship to
college administrators during the sports boom of the 1920s.32 The 
29. The NCAA’s online history recites significant changes in governance in 1952, 
1973, and 1997.  The History of the NCAA, supra note 27.  See generally  JOSEPH N.
CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA: THE NCAA’S FIRST CENTURY (2006). 
 30. CROWLEY, supra note 29, at 67; Gabriel A. Morgan, No More Playing 
Favorites: Reconsidering the Conclusive Congressional Presumption that Intercollegiate 
Athletics Are Substantially Related to Educational Purposes, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 149, 165 
(2007); To Fix Standards of College Sports: Directors of Athletics and Physical 
Education Confer in New York This Week, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1919, at S3; see also
RICHARD HOFSTADTER & C. DEWITT HARDY, THE DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 114 (1952) (“[T]here are ‘few important schools 
without an important stadium and without coaches whose salaries top those of the 
teaching staff.’” (citation omitted)); Carter, supra note 22, at 266 (“Schools accused the 
media of . . . resisting attempts to maintain amateurism by whipping up public opposition 
to institutional actions.”).
31. Some have referred to this era as “The Golden Age of Sports.”  Davenport, 
supra note 7, at 219–20; see also  HOFSTADTER & HARDY, supra note 30, at 114 (“The 
alumnus is important to the university; he is a major source of direct support; he is its 
lifeline to the community.”); Carter, supra note 22, at 266. 
32. John L. Griffith, The Carnegie Reports: Another View of the Study of College 
Athletics Made by the Carnegie Foundation, 1 J. HIGHER EDUC. 325, 326–27 (1930). 
The 1929 Carnegie Foundation Report “documented the rampant professionalism,
commercialization, and exploitation that were corrupting virtually all aspects of intercollegiate 
athletics.”  Charles Farrell, Historical Overview, in THE RULES OF THE GAME: ETHICS IN 
COLLEGE SPORT 3, 8 (Richard E. Lapchick & John Brooks Slaughter eds., 1989); see
HOWARD J. SAVAGE ET AL., AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETICS, BULLETIN NUMBER
TWENTY-THREE (1929) (known colloquially as the “Carnegie Report”); see also
Davenport, supra note 7, at 221 (“[The Carnegie Report] described all the abuses in 
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Carnegie Report found “rampant professionalism, commercialization, 
and exploitation that were corrupting virtually all aspects of intercollegiate 
athletics,”33 and documented a litany of institution-specific bad practices.34 
Even during the general belt-tightening of higher education caused by
reduced incomes during the Depression era, the problems of illegal player
inducements and recruiting seemed to continue unabated.35 
World War II offered a five-year interregnum in big-time college 
athletics.  With the end of the war and the advent of national television 
came a resurgence and growth of interscholastic athletics.  At the same
time, college athletic departments became significant revenue generators, 
and many became divorced from university physical education
department control.36  Money, usually tied to winning programs, became 
the driving force in athletic departments, and the fate of university 
presidents sometimes hinged on the fortunes of their institutions’ athletic 
teams.37  Athlete recruiting abuses, basketball scandals, and other distressing 
events reached a peak.38 
college sport and urged the college administrators to take charge and to clean up the 
situation.”); Robert N. Davis, Academics and Athletics on a Collision Course, 66 N.D. L. 
REV. 239, 245 (1990) (“[The Carnegie Report] focused on abuses in intercollegiate 
sports and urged that the universities do something to rectify the abuses.”); Eric J. 
Sobocinski, College Athletes: What Is Fair Compensation?, 7 MARQ. SPORTS. L.J. 257, 
273 (1996) (“The [Carnegie Report] suggested that recruiting had become corrupt, 
professionals had replaced amateurs, education was being neglected and commercialism 
reigned.”); Study of College Athletics: Carnegie Foundation Reports—Recruiting and 
Subsidizing Are General—Findings About Cornell, 32 CORNELL ALUMNI NEWS, 82, 82 
(1929) (“Classification of colleges and universities according to the degree and kind of
recruiting and subsidizing of athletes is one of the outstanding features of the survey of 
American college athletics by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching.”).  The litany of abuses identified in the Carnegie Report included the on-
campus power of intercollegiate sports competition, administrative failures of oversight 
of football programs, plus particularized lists of seemingly institution-specific bad 
behavior.  SAVAGE ET AL., supra. 
 33. Farrell, supra note 32, at 8; see  CROWLEY, supra note 29, at 65–66; Griffith, 
supra note 32, at 325–27.
34. See Davenport, supra note 7, at 221; Sobocinski, supra note 32, at 273–74. 
 35. CROWLEY, supra note 29, at 68; Davenport, supra note 7, at 221. 
 36. Davenport, supra note 7, at 222; see Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics,
11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 14 (2000). 
 37. Davenport, supra note 7, at 222; see also Tom Cushman, Examining NCAA 
from the Inside Out, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 11, 1995, at C1 (“[T]he entire 
apparatus [of intercollegiate athletics] is tailored to produce only one thing . . . money for 
coaches and universities.” (ellipsis in original)); Austin Murphy, Fast Times at Punahou, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 26, 2008, at 61 (quoting George Cross, the President of
Oklahoma University in the 1950s, speaking about his desire to “build a university the 
football team can be proud of”). 
 38. Davenport, supra note 7, at 223; Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate
Athletic Association’s Death Penalty: How Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 
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In response, the NCAA evolved from an advisory body into a powerful 
national regulatory body that made rules, systematized policing of rules 
infractions, and imposed sanctions on its member institutions for rules 
violations.39  The NCAA was authorized by its member schools to censure, 
penalize, expel, and enforce sanctions against institutions for rules 
violations that contravened its basic objective “to maintain intercollegiate 
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as 
an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line 
of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”40 
This did not, however, adversely affect the popularity of intercollegiate
athletics or stem the market-driven tide of increasing revenues generated
by college sports events.  For the past sixty years, the commercialization 
of intercollegiate sports has continued to grow, largely in response to the
enormous popularity of Division I FBS football and men’s basketball 
and the consequent multimillion-dollar, revenue-generating potential of 
these sports.  For instance, CBS agreed to pay the NCAA $6 billion from 
2002 to 2013 to broadcast its men’s basketball tournament.41  A May  
2009 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) paper, entitled Tax Preferences 
for Collegiate Sports, states that the 2008 NCAA men’s basketball 
tournament generated approximately $143 million in revenue for college 
athletic departments and that FBS bowl games generated roughly the 
same amount.42  The CBO paper includes data showing that the 2004– 
2005 fiscal year average athletic program revenues for universities with
Division I FBS football and men’s basketball teams was $35.2 million.43 
IND. L.J. 985, 992 (1987); Dwight Chapin, “The Fix” Offers Insight into College
Basketball Scandal, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 16, 2002, at C2. 
 39. Davenport, supra note 7, at 222; Smith, supra note 36, at 15.  As one
university president remarked recently, “[N]o one can or will stick his neck out . . . .
[P]residents have lost their jobs over athletics.  Presidents and chancellors are afraid to
rock the boat.”  KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 10, at 16. 
For one journalist’s case study of how the NCAA’s rulemaking powers can create a 
“black market” among high school athletes being recruited by colleges and universities 
see MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BLIND SIDE: EVOLUTION OF A GAME 196–205 (2006). 
 40. NCAA CONST. art. 1, § 1.3.1, reprinted in NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N,
2009–10 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1, 1 (2009), available at http://www.ncaapublicatio 
ns.com/p-3934-2009-2010-ncaa-division-i-manual.aspx. 
 41. CBS Renews NCAA B’Ball, CBS MONEY (NOV. 18, 1999, 8:39 PM)
http://money.cnn.com/1999/11/18/news/ncaa/. 
 42. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TAX PREFERENCES FOR COLLEGIATE SPORTS, 
at vii (2009). 
43. Id. at 4. 
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IV. USE OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AS A
WINDOW TO THE UNIVERSITY
America’s academic leaders are immersed in society’s economic 
climate.  There are intense pressures to attract larger incoming classes of 
students with stronger academic credentials, increase political and
cultural support of their institutions from the larger community, recruit
and retain high quality faculty, enlarge fundraising for brick and mortar, 
expand endowment, and grow their academic programs.  In an extremely
competitive higher education market, academic leaders increasingly use 
intercollegiate sports as a catalyst and means to achieve these legitimate 
ends.  This rational conduct is merely a facet of competition in a well-
functioning democratic society that embodies the centuries-old American 
enterprising spirit of doing what is necessary to compete successfully. 
Regarding the relationship between competition in intercollegiate 
athletics and competition within higher education, Sidney McPhee, the 
president of Middle Tennessee State University, explained: 
Competition among institutions of higher education may be perceived as being
confined to the playing field. It is not.  While we tend to think of higher education 
as a homogeneous collection of colleges and universities, individually they are 
varied and aggressively competing with one another for resources, talent and 
standing. . . .  Competition on the playing field as in higher education is a
fundamental principle of a free-enterprise system.44 
Universities allocate funds to intercollegiate athletics based on their
perceived institutional value, which is the same way resources are
allocated to their academic programs and other activities.  The most
positive institutional features found in the following examples of 
institutional success stories—stronger faculty recruitment, larger student 
bodies with better academic credentials, more financial resources,
statewide political clout—are driven in large part by devoting increased
resources to intercollegiate athletics.  All these institutional stories share 
one crucial commonality: university leaders perceived and acted upon 
their perception of a symbiotic interdependence between a successful
intercollegiate athletics program and institutional academic growth as an
energizing reality in twenty-first century American higher education.45 
 44. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF DIV. I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS,
THE SECOND-CENTURY IMPERATIVES: PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP—INSTITUTIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY 23 (2006), available at http://coia.comm.psu.edu/NCAA%20Presidential 
%20Task%20Force%20final%20report%20Oct%2006.pdf. 
45. Attempting to convince her counterpart that the University of Nebraska should 
remain a member of the Big 12 Conference to prevent its possible demise, which could 
result in the University of Kansas’s loss of membership in a major athletics conference, 
Kansas chancellor Bernadette Gray-Little stated: “There are some universities that survive
and thrive without a large athletic program. I hope we don’t have to test that out.” 
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Institutional success stories are not limited to nostalgic tales from a 
quaint past.  A small Catholic college, originally called L’Universite de 
Notre Dame du Lac, founded in 1842 in a wilderness area of Indiana 
rose in lockstep with its athletic fame to become the internationally 
renowned institution named Notre Dame.46  Similarly, the past century 
records the storied growth of interscholastic sports among a cluster of
highly regarded Midwestern universities that created the Big Ten: Michigan, 
Chicago,47 Northwestern, Wisconsin, Purdue, Illinois, and Minnesota.48 
As the following examples illustrate, modern chapters are being written 
today by many colleges and universities across America.
On New Year’s Day 2007, steep underdog Boise State University ran
a daring Statue of Liberty play for a two-point conversion and posted a 
43–42 overtime upset against the favored Oklahoma Sooners.49  This  
soon resulted in millions of dollars in new pledges for the university’s 
business and nursing schools, growth in the number of graduate school 
inquiries, increased political recognition among Idaho legislators,
merchandising contracts, Hollywood inquiries about film rights, national 
recognition on ESPN and other cable sports shows, leaps in alumni
giving and other fundraising not solely directed toward athletics, and 
local retail business boosts.50 Officials believe that the energizing bounce to
the school and to the community of Boise “will pay off for years.”51 
The University of Florida’s (UF) intercollegiate athletics success is
noteworthy for its heated competition with several other Florida 
universities for higher education support.  During recent seasons when 
the University of Florida won multiple national basketball and football 
Associated Press, Gray-Little Planned To Call Missouri Too, ESPN.COM (last updated
June 8, 2010, 8:53 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5262068. 
 46. MURRAY SPERBER, SHAKE DOWN THE THUNDER: THE CREATION OF NOTRE
DAME FOOTBALL 5–7 (Ind. Univ. Press 2002) (1993). 
47. The University of Chicago was instrumental in founding the Big Ten 
Conference in 1897; however, in 1939 President Robert Hutchins abolished football, and 
Chicago withdrew from the Big Ten.  Big Ten History, BIG TEN CONF. OFFICIAL ATHLETIC 
SITE, http://www.bigten.org/trads/big10-trads.html (last visited Aug 1, 2010).  The university
reinstated its intercollegiate football program in 1969.  History of the University, U. CHI.,
http://www.uchicago.edu/about/history.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2010).
48. Big Ten History, supra note 47.  See generally Davenport, supra note 7, at 219. 
49. Jill Lieber Steeg, Boise State Fiesta Goes On; Ticket Sales, Fundraising, 
Marketing Booming, USA TODAY, Aug. 20, 2007, at C1; Pat Forde, Broncos Earn
Respect with Improbable Victory, ESPN.COM (last updated Jan. 2, 2007, 10:20 AM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2716979&type=Columnist&imagesPrint=off. 
50. See Steeg, supra note 49, at C1. 
51. Id.
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championships, UF’s fundraising increased by 38% to $183 million— 
with only 50% of the increase directed to athletics.52  UF recently  
launched a new $1.5 billion university fundraising campaign,53 which
undoubtedly will benefit from the national notoriety generated by its
intercollegiate program.
The University of South Florida (USF), keenly aware of its 
competitive struggles with UF as well as the University of Miami and 
Florida State University in the Florida marketplace, took several steps 
towards expanding its growth and reputation.  USF commissioned a 
national survey of high school students, sought ways to leverage national 
exposure of athletic success, initiated recruitment efforts for high-
performance students tied into football events, and quietly laid plans to 
capitalize on growing alumni pride with a $500 million to $1 billion 
university fundraising campaign.54 USF has become a modern paradigm
of the linkage between university growth and big-time athletics, or, as 
one USF student put it, “It’s sad, but true: A good athletic program 
brings attention to the university.”55 
Media attention was USF’s objective when it launched its inaugural
football season in September 1997.56  USF President Judy Genshaft
makes the point widely accepted by many university administrators that
a winning athletic program helps a school recruit top faculty and staff 
members and better market the school’s academic and research
programs to prospective students.57  Genshaft says, “Those top-ranked
professors typically come from top-ranked institutions. . . .  Most top-ranked 
institutions also have Tier 1 athletics. . . .  You get people introduced
through athletics, take them by the hand and introduce them to the rest of
the university.”58  Overall, USF’s quantitative rise is startling.59 
 52. Adam Emerson, USF Officials Prepare for Perks of Success: Short-Term Rise
Seen in Donations, Applications, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 2, 2007, at 1.
53. Id. See also Florida Tomorrow: The Campaign for the University of Florida, 
U. FLA., http://www.floridatomorrow.ufl.edu/about.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2010); 
University of Florida Athletics, U. FLA., http://www.ufl.edu/athletics/ (last visited Aug. 
1, 2010). 
 54. Emerson, supra note 52, at 1. 
 55. Rodney Thrash, Now Nation Knows Who Bulls Are, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES 
(St. Petersburg, Fla.), Sept. 28, 2007, at 1A; see Emerson, supra note 52, at 1. 
 56. Emerson, supra note 52, at 1; Thrash, supra note 55, at 1A. 
 57. Thrash, supra note 55, at 1A.  A USF website emphasizes the recent growth
and prestige of the university as a research center. See The USF Research Park of
Tampa Bay: “Emerging Research Park of the Year,” USF CONNECT, http://www.Usf 
connect.org/Research-Park.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). 
 58. Thrash, supra note 55, at 1A.  In regard to Genshaft’s accuracy, note that U.S. 
News & World Report creates a list every year of the top academic institutions
throughout the country.  See generally The 2009 Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., at
88–129.  In viewing the list, one can see that many of the top institutions are not only
academically inclined but athletically as well. See id.  Notable schools in order of 
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When he took office in 1998, North Dakota State University (NDSU) 
President Joe Chapman had a vision for growth at NDSU beyond its
roots as a regional institution.60  Although not a rabid sports fan himself, 
a key part of President Chapman’s plan for realizing his vision of 
expansion involved shifting the athletic program to present a new and
big-time face to the nation.61  The athletic budget rose from $6.2 million 
in 2003 to $10.5 million in 2007.62  In order to generate public support
for its increased athletic budget, NDSU also expanded from fifteen
doctoral programs to forty-two and more than doubled its research
budget.63  NDSU also moved up to Division II athletics and successfully 
sought scheduling of Division I opponents.64  NDSU believed that “[a]
successful football program could drive fundraising and rally support”
for the school’s expanded reach.65 
Georgia State University (GSU) President Carl V. Patton believes 
creating a competitive intercollegiate football program is “desirable (if 
academic ranking in the top fifty are Stanford University at fourth, Duke University at
eighth, University of Notre Dame and Vanderbilt University tied at eighteenth,
University of California—Berkeley at twenty-first, University of Virginia at twenty-
third, University of California—Los Angeles at twenty-fifth, University of Michigan at 
twenty-sixth, University of Southern California at twenty-seventh, University of North 
Carolina—Chapel Hill at thirtieth, Boston College at thirty-fourth, University of
Wisconsin—Madison at thirty-fifth, University of Washington at forty-first, Pennsylvania 
State University and University of Texas—Austin tied at forty-seventh, and University
of Florida at forty-ninth.  Id. at 88 (ranking the “Best National Universities”).
 59. Thrash, supra note 55, at 1A.  USF has enjoyed phenomenal growth in
numbers and quality of its student body—enrollment up from 39,000 to 45,000 in five
years, making it Florida’s third largest public university. Id.  USF had spent years trying
to shed the image of a “commuter school” and to see itself as an equal with the other 
Florida megacampuses.  Id.  The increased demand for admissions has pushed upward
the credentials of USF applicants to an average 3.71 high school GPA in fall 2007, with 
nearly one applicant in four ranked in the top ten percent of the applicant’s high school 
class.  Emerson, supra note 52, at 1.  This increased admissions demand—allowing 
greater USF selectivity of student enrollment—is seen as “just one effect of a successful
football season.”  Id.  “[N]onstop” marketing of USF merchandise has become big
business for Tampa-St. Petersburg suppliers.  Thrash, supra note 55, at 1A.  Orders pour 
into local outfitters from as far away as Brazil, with local banks, governments, and
merchants all aboard the USF marketing ride. Id.
 60. Rachel Blount, Warning to Gophers: Here Come the Bison, STAR TRIB.































      
 
 











not close to mandatory),”66 as GSU seeks to transform itself from a
commuter school to a “full-rounded college education.”67  Achieving 
this “full-rounded college education” meant that the school must become 
a “real” university.68  According to Patton, what prospective GSU students
mean when they want GSU to be a “real” university “is a university that 
has successful sports programs, and football is one of the things they
want.”69 
The striking growth and visibility of the University of Connecticut 
(UConn) has been based on an intercollegiate basketball-centered strategy.70 
 66. Doug Lederman, Flocking to Football, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 20, 2008), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/05/20/football. 
67. Id.
68. Id.  Additionally, President Patton found widespread support among GSU 
alumni, students, and staff.  Thus serious discussions for the addition of football began in 
2005 and in 2007, and as a step in that direction, Dan Reeves was hired as the lead 
consultant.  Id.  On April 17, 2008, GSU officially announced that it would begin
Division 1-AA competition starting in the 2010 season in the Colonial Athletic 
Association, with home games being played at the Georgia Dome.  Kickoff in 2010:
Football Era To Begin at Georgia State, GA. ST. U. (Apr. 17, 2008), http://www2. 
gsu.edu/~wwwexa/news/archive/2008/08_0417-football.htm.  GSU also purchased a 3.8-
acre tract of land for $6.6 million on which to build a brand new practice facility.
Georgia State Buys Land for Football Practice Facility, ATLANTA BUS. CHRON., Oct. 28,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 20562100.  The final piece of the GSU game plan was 
hiring Bill Curry to be the school’s first head football coach.  See Bill Curry, GA. ST.
ATHLETICS, http://www.georgiastatesports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DBOEMID=12700& 
ATCLID=1480479 (last visited Aug 1, 2010). 
 69. Lederman, supra note 66.  As another illustration, Mississippi Governor Haley 
Barbour’s fall 2009 suggestion that the state’s fifteen community colleges eliminate or
significantly downsize their intercollegiate athletics programs to save costs in response 
to major state budget cuts was met with dismay by college presidents and athletics 
directors.  David Moltz, Cutting Community College Athletics, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June
24, 2010), http://www.insidehighered.com/layout/set/print/news/2010/06/24/athletics.  James
Southward, the director of athletics activities for the Mississippi State Board for
Community & Junior Colleges stated:
Mississippi has a very storied and prestigious position in community and junior
college football, probably more so than any other state.  Our football, basketball, 
baseball and women’s softball teams are very costly to operate, but they’re
also the sports that bring students onto campus.  It’s kind of a pay-back 
situation.  The feeling among most of our presidents is that if they start cutting
out some of these major sports, they would see a drop in enrollment.  If that 
happens, it’s as bad as being cut in funding. 
Id.
 70. UConn Traditions reports on President Philip E. Austin’s 10 years of 
expansion and success in all academic programs in the same breath as noting successes
in basketball and soccer.  Mike Pesca, UConn on Defensive as It Aims for
Championship, NPR (Apr. 4, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=102748053&sc=emaf;  see also Philip E. Austin: 10 Years as UConn President, 
UCONN MAG., Fall/Winter 2006, available at http://uconnmagazine.uconn.edu/fwin2006/
fwin06au.Html; Daniel D. Delaney, Accounting for Athletics: A Balanced Scorecard 
Approach 10–11, app. F (May 6, 2008) (unpublished honors thesis, University of 
Connecticut), available at http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1053& 
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The UConn story parallels the same script described above respecting
Boise State, South Florida, NDSU, and GSU—employing athletics as a 
useful tool to achieve greater public recognition and prominence.71  This
recognition is then used to generate better and bigger entering classes,
alumni support, public funding, and other university objectives.72  As yet
another example, a full-page ad in the business section of the December
8, 2009, edition of the Chicago Tribune touted Texas Christian University’s
12–0 football season:
[At TCU] we’ve got more than just a great football team.  Our total 24/7
university experience includes a beautiful residential campus, academics that engage
students in research, and study abroad programs so Horned Frogs can explore 
the world. . . .
Big-time athletics.  World-class academics.  It all adds up to the exceptional
TCU experience.73 
NCAA member educational institutions outside of Division I have 
also relied on intercollegiate athletics as a means of revitalization or 
transformation.  Adrian College, a liberal arts college in Michigan, used 
intercollegiate athletics to completely turn itself around in three years. 
Before 2005, Adrian’s administration and faculty despaired because of 
their slumping enrollment and campus malaise.74  They decided to use
intercollegiate athletics as recruiting tool in an attempt to reverse the 
decline and, in doing so, discovered “the fountain of youth for small 
liberal arts colleges.”75  Since 2005, Adrian’s enrollment has surged 57%
to its highest number—1470—in twenty years, and the academic caliber
of students has shot up.76  Before 2005, Adrian had accepted 93% of its 
pool of 1200 applicants.77  Since adopting its athletics-based student 
recruiting strategy, Adrian now accepts only 72% of the applicants from
context=srhonorstheses (revealing an overall increased applicant pool from 13,000 to
21,000 during 2002–2007 and a startling 99% retention rate for student athletes). 
71. Supra note 70 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 44–71 and accompanying text; see also Philip E. Austin: 10 
Years as UConn President, supra note 70 (discussing the integral role played by soccer 
and basketball in President Philip E. Austin’s ten years of expansion and success in all
academic programs). 
 73. CHI. TRIB., Dec. 8, 2010, § 1, at 33. 
 74. Libby Sander, Athletics Raises a College from the Ground Up, CHRON. HIGHER 
ED., Sept. 19, 2008, at A1, A18, available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v55/i04/04a00 
101.htm?utmsource=at&utmmedium=en. 
75. Id.
76. Id. at A1. 
77. Id.
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a nearly fourfold larger pool of 4200 applications and reports that its 
student body has better academic credentials.78 
Roosevelt University, a private university in downtown Chicago, is 
restoring its intercollegiate athletics program after a nearly twenty-year 
hiatus.79  During the past decade, the university has transitioned from a 
largely commuter institution with adult part-time students to a more 
residential school with an increasing number of full-time, traditional-aged
students, many of whom want the university to bring back intercollegiate 
athletics.80 With the approval of Roosevelt’s faculty, university
administrators are embarking on a plan to create twelve sports teams, not
including football, to resume participating in intercollegiate athletics 
competition in fall 2010, and to rejoin the National Association of 
Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA).81  After five years, Roosevelt plans to 
apply for admission to NCAA Division III.82 
Some writers decry the disparity between costs and funding sources of 
the large, established athletics programs compared to those of smaller
programs, dubbing the disparity “The Athletics Tax.”83  As an illustration of
this purportedly unfair disparity one writer sets up a comparison between
the University of Michigan and Eastern Michigan University—a comparison 
that is historically uninformed or economically naïve.84 
78. Id.




82. Id. Yet another example of this phenomenon: Post University, a for-profit 
institution that offers fifteen sports in NCAA Division II but has four times as many
online students as those attending classes in person, recently joined the Collegiate Sprint
Football League, an eastern athletic association whose members include Cornell, Penn 
State, Princeton, Army, and Navy.  David Moltz, Rubbing Shoulder Pads with Elites, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 11, 2009), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/12/11/ 
football.  The playing rules for sprint football are the same as those for traditional college
football, but all players must weigh 172 pounds or less to be eligible to participate.  Id. 
Ken Zirkle, Post University’s president, hopes that adding sprint football will increase 
the university’s male student body and foster a stronger sense of community among
students.  He states: 
Online students want to take pride in their university.  I expect that adding [a
sprint football team] will do nothing but enhance that. We already have alumni
clamoring for a homecoming event, and a football game is a natural venue for
that.  Football has a certain mystique, and I know the benefits of it, having 
experienced them firsthand at other institutions. 
Id.  Others have suggested that sprint football may be an attractive, low-cost option for 
institutions that recently have discontinued their traditional college football programs,
such as Hofstra University and Northeastern University. Id.
83. See, e.g., David Moltz, The Athletics Tax,  INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 1, 2010), 
http://insidehighered.com/news/2010/06/01/subsidies. 
84. Id. David Moltz underscores the unfairness of the funding differences between
the University of Michigan and Eastern Michigan University.  Id.  This view is either
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As the president of one major university recently put it, “Mega college 
athletics . . . reflects the decisions of academic administrators and governing 
boards at almost all colleges and universities for over a century.  It prospers
because for the most part we (our faculty, our staff, our alumni, our 
legislators, our trustees, our students, and our many other constituencies)
want it.”85 
V. COMMERCIALIZED INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS:
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY VALUES CONFLICTS AND    
ADVERSE EDUCATIONAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS
The use of intercollegiate sports by university leaders—who must 
explore all options in an effort to increase the human, financial, and 
other resources needed by their institutions, as part of their efforts to 
enable their respective institutions to flourish in an increasingly
competitive higher education environment—is a rational response to 
marketplace realities.86  On the other hand, the NCAA Constitution 
historically uninformed or economically naïve.  If the president and governing board of
the University of Michigan have long decided that establishing a strong athletic profile 
attracts more and better students, faculty, alumni funding, and political support—the 
usual consensus of college and university presidents—then of course Michigan now 
enjoys the economic momentum and support from all sources—and to a greater degree 
than its lesser rivals.  Similarly, if the president and governing board of Eastern Michigan
University decides today on seeking a stronger athletic profile to enhance EMU’s 
program, then they face the same front-end costs of any new and aspiring enterprise,
public or private.  EMU will be forced to seek new funding from all available sources. 
 85. Lombardi, supra note 18. 
86. In economic terms:
The noncompulsory nature of higher education forces the institution to
behave in a manner similar to the firm. Because students can choose from a variety
of colleges, each institution must provide a desirable package at a competitive
price to attract applicants. Because higher education services are seen by
prospective consumers as both a source of human capital investment and as a
consumption good, each college must allocate its resources to achieve 
maximum benefit. . . . 
. . . According to this argument, athletics is consistent with the mission of a
university because it develops desirable traits “such as courage, integrity and
coolness under pressure.”  Clearly, developing these traits is consistent with 
the view of college as a human capital investment.
. . . According to the utilitarian perspective, college athletics garner local 
and/or national support for the university, generate revenue to support the 
university mission, and create a sense of community among students, faculty, 
and alumni. Note that the utilitarian focus is not just on the benefits of athletics to
student-athletes but to the entire university community.  From this viewpoint, 
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provides that college and university presidents have “ultimate responsibility
and final authority for the conduct of . . . intercollegiate athletics,”87 and 
they must not allow commercialized intercollegiate athletics to assume a
role inconsistent with an institution of higher education’s core values 
and academic mission, or to have harmful economic consequences and 
effects.88 
According to the NCAA, “Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an 
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated 
primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to 
be derived.  Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an 
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enterprises.”89  Professor Timothy Davis
has aptly characterized this idealized view of intercollegiate athletics 
espoused by the NCAA as the “amateur/education” model.90  However, 
as previously discussed, true amateurism is nonexistent, especially today
when many student-athletes receive “compensation” for participating in 
intercollegiate sports in the form of an economically valuable athletic 
scholarship that covers the costs of their college tuition, room, board, 
and books.91  Nevertheless, this model may accurately encompass most 
intercollegiate athletics competition and student-athletes, particularly 
women’s and men’s sports that do not generate net revenues in excess of
their production costs. 
Those who participate in intercollegiate athletics are expected to strive 
for excellence in both academics and athletics, unlike professional
intercollegiate athletics are promoted as spectator sports, contributing to the 
“consumption good” component of the university “product.” 
Daniel R. Marburger & Nancy Hogshead-Makar, Is Title IX Really To Blame for the 
Decline in Intercollegiate Men’s Nonrevenue Sports?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 65, 74– 
75 (2003) (internal citations omitted). 
 87. NCAA CONST. art. 6, § 6.1.1, reprinted in NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 
2009–10 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 43. 
 88. See id. at 1.  For example, the University of California, Berkeley’s athletics 
department, despite receiving annual multimillion-dollar institutional subsidies, incurred
multimillion dollar operating deficits from 2004–2006 in violation of a University of 
California system policy requiring university athletic departments to be self-supporting. 
Doug Lederman, Bad Time for Sports Overspending, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct., 30, 2009), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/10/30/ucsports.  In 2007, the university’s central 
administration forgave $31 million in previous loans to the athletics department to cover 
annual deficits, and recently loaned the athletics department $12 million to cover its 
projected 2009 and 2010 operating deficits.  Id.  Difficult economic times have forced
virtually all other university academic programs and campus operations to cut their 
budgets, as well as required Berkeley faculty and staff to take unpaid furlough days.  Id. 
 89. NCAA CONST. art. 2, § 2.9, reprinted in NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 
2009–10 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 4.
 90. Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting
Realities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269, 270 (1994). 
91. See supra Part III. 
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athletes whose sole focus is on the latter objective.  Consistent with the 
educational component of the amateur/education model, student-athletes’ 
participation in intercollegiate athletics does in fact have several academic
and future career benefits.92  Analysis of data from a 2007 NCAA study
of 8000 former student-athletes reveals that (1) 88% of student-athletes 
earn their baccalaureate degrees, compared to less than 25% of the
American adult population; (2) 91% of former Division I student-
athletes are employed full-time, 11% more than the general population, 
and average higher income levels than non-student-athletes; (3) 89% of 
former student-athletes believe the skills and values learned from 
participating in intercollegiate athletics helped them obtain their current 
employment in a career other than playing professional sports; and (4) 27% 
of former Division I student-athletes earn a postgraduate degree.93  This
is substantiated by a similar 1991 economic study.94 
On the other hand, the commercial/education model, which “assumes
that college sports is a commercial enterprise subject to the same
economic considerations as any other industry,”95 more accurately 
describes intercollegiate sports such as Division I FBS football and 
men’s basketball.  Universities’ commercial exploitation of the entertainment
value of these two enormously popular sports creates an inherent tension
with their academic missions and has the potential to overshadow or 
marginalize the educational aspects of intercollegiate athletics.96 As
92. Gary T. Brown, Research Validates Value, and Values, of Athletics, NCAA.ORG 
(Feb. 12, 2007, 1:01:01 AM), http://web1.ncaa.org/webfiles/NCAANewsArchive/2007/ 
Association-wide/index.html (follow “Research validates value, and values of athletics”
hyperlink). 
93. Id.
94. See James E. Long & Steven B. Caudill, The Impact of Participation in 
Intercollegiate Athletics on Income and Graduation, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 525, 525– 
29 (1991). 
 95. Davis, supra note 90, at 279. 
96. However, this is not inevitable.  The “Sweet Sixteen” bracket for the 2009 
NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament included several teams—North Carolina, Kansas, 
Duke, and Villanova—whose members’ Academic Performance Rate was near the top of
the national academic rankings for teams participating in the Tournament.  Compare
2009 Men’s NCAA Tournament Bracket, USATODAY.COM (Mar. 16, 2009, 12:09 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/tourney09/bracket.htm (document
ing the results of the 2009 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament), with David Moltz, The 
Academic Performance Tournament, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 16, 2009), www.insideh
ighered.com/layout/set/print/news/2009/03/16/ncaa (documenting the results of the 2009
Inside Higher Ed Academic Performance Tournament).  North Carolina, the 2009 on-
court men’s champion, also won the “Academic Performance Tournament.” See 2009
Men’s NCAA Tournament Bracket, supra (documenting North Carolina’s path in the 2009
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former NCAA President Myles Brand observed, there is rising concern
that the values important to higher education have been “overwhelmed” 
by the popularity of intercollegiate athletics to media and marketing, and
“[a]s pressures to win and to generate revenue increase, the integration 
of athletics with the academy, the interference with presidential authority 
by avid fans or governing board members, and the primacy of education 
in the student-athlete experience all have been threatened.”97 
In addition to potential conflicts with a university’s academic mission 
and educational values, the multimillion-dollar cost of producing 
intercollegiate athletics may have adverse economic effects.  According 
to a February 2009 study commissioned by the NCAA, Division I athletic 
departments with FBS football and men’s basketball teams increased
their spending by an average of almost 10.7% annually from 2004–2007, 
with their annual revenues increasing by 10.6%, which evidences roughly 
a one-for-one relationship between athletic expenditures and revenues.98 
This increased spending on intercollegiate athletics was more than
double the average 4.9% annual increase in these universities’ overall 
nonathletics spending during this time period.99  The study also found 
data that supports the existence of an “arms race”—“a situation in which
the athletic expenditures by a given school tend to increase along with 
expenditures by other schools in the same conference”—at this level of 
intercollegiate athletics competition.100  Although the annual salaries of
many football and basketball coaches exceed $1 million,101 the study 
NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament resulting in its championship victory); Moltz, 
supra (documenting North Carolina’s path in the 2009 Inside Higher Ed Academic 
Performance Tournament resulting in its championship victory). 
97. Gary T. Brown, Key Division I Report Calls for Local-Level Financial
Solutions, NCAA.ORG (Oct. 23, 2006, 1:01:10 AM), http://web1.ncaa.org/web_files/NC 
AANewsArchive/2006/Association-wide/index.html (follow “Key Division I report calls
for local-level financial solutions” hyperlink).  To address the problem of trustee intrusion 
into presidential governance of intercollegiate athletics, the Association of Governing 
Boards of Colleges and Universities (AGB) has adopted policies advising trustees to
“exercise [their] fiduciary responsibility and oversight for intercollegiate athletics the 
same way that [they] would for other aspects of the undergraduate experience.”  Doug
Lederman, The Board Role in College Sports,  INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 8, 2009), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/layout/set/print/news/2009/04/08/agb.  AGB holds that 
“efforts to achieve an appropriate balance [require that] . . . governing board members 
will need to lend consistent and public support to their chief executives and academic 
leaders who are at the forefront of such discussions.” Id.
 98. JONATHAN ORSZAG & MARK ISRAEL, THE EMPIRICAL EFFECTS OF COLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS: AN UPDATE BASED ON 2004–2007 DATA 3–4 (2009), available at http:// 
web1.ncaa.org/web_files/DI_MC_BOD/DI_BOD/2009/April/04,%20EmpiricalEffects.pdf.
 99. ORSZAG & ISRAEL, supra note 98, at 4. 
100. Id. at 11. 
101. See infra note 111. 
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found no significant relationship between coaching salaries and the
teams’ winning percentages.102 
A report concerning the 2004–2006 NCAA revenues and expenses of
Division I intercollegiate athletics programs found that only 19 of 119
Division I FBS institutions generated revenues that exceeded their 
expenses in the 2006 fiscal year.103  From 2004–2006, only sixteen 
institutions reported positive net revenues.104  For 2006, salaries for
coaches and administrators accounted for 32% of total expenses.105 The
2006 median salary for basketball head coaches was $611,900, a 15% 
increase from the 2004 median; for football head coaches, it was 
$855,500, a 47% increase from the 2004 median.106  Total athletic 
department spending was approximately 5% of total university expenses 
at median FBS institutions.107 
In a 2009 report analyzing the costs of financing intercollegiate sports, 
the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics found that a
significant majority of college and university presidents regard the 
increasing costs of maintaining a competitive intercollegiate athletic 
program as a critical source of budget pressure.108 The rapidly escalating 
costs of coaches’ salaries are a major barrier to the sustainability of
intercollegiate athletics programs.109 
In 2007, for the first time, the average annual salary of the 120
Division 1A football coaches reached $1 million, excluding perks and 
bonuses.110  This average includes over fifty coaches who are making 
seven figure salaries and at least a dozen who are making $2 million or 
more.111  In December 2009, the University of Texas increased head
football coach Mack Brown’s annual salary from $3 million to at least 
 102. ORSZAG & ISRAEL, supra note 98, at 8. 
 103. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2004–06 NCAA REVENUES AND 
EXPENSES OF DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 7, 11, 13
(2008), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/RE2008.pdf. 




 108. KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETICS, supra note 10, at 35–40. 
109. See id.
110. Steve Wieberg & Jodi Upton, College Football Coaches Calling Lucrative 



























$5 million for the remainder of his contract through 2016.112  Will 
Muschamp, Brown’s defensive coordinator and “head coach-in-waiting,” 
makes $900,000 annually, which is nearly $300,000 more than the 
university president’s yearly salary.113 
Antitrust law is perceived as a legal impediment to any joint effort to 
limit the current arms race that is driving up coaching salaries.114  College 
and university presidents also consider highly publicized coaching salaries
as a source of internal and external friction.115 
Despite such problems and other criticisms, a vast majority of presidents 
remain convinced that the net total subjective and objective benefits of 
intercollegiate athletics programs are a vital component of institutional 
success in achieving broader objectives, such as attracting student applicants 
in greater numbers and with stronger credentials, increasing fundraising
outside of athletics, improving national visibility and relative reputation 
vis-à-vis other institutions, and increasing political influence.116 
VI. UNIVERSITY ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT REVENUES
SHOULD REMAIN EXEMPT FROM FEDERAL TAXATION 
Some commentators have taken the position that the increasing
commercialization of college and university athletic programs requires a
reexamination of federal tax laws pertaining to those programs and 
congressional modification of these laws.117  Specifically, the argument 
is that many intercollegiate athletic programs, particularly those with 
Division I FBS and men’s basketball teams, have become large and 
profitable businesses insufficiently related to education; as a result, 
Congress should reexamine whether college and university athletic 
programs, as well as the NCAA, should be entitled to exemption from 
 112. Associated Press, Brown To Receive $5M a Season, ESPN.COM (Dec. 9, 2009), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=4728932&type=HeadlineNew&imagesPrint=off. 
 113. Mike Fish, What Price Glory? The Star’s Value, ESPN.COM (last updated Dec. 
17, 2009, 6:44 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=4732298&type=Story&Im
agesPrint=off.  By further comparison, Muschamp’s annual salary is more than the 
$627,109 yearly base salary that which University of Texas Athletic Director DeLoss 
Dodds makes.  See Florida’s Jeremy Foley Ranks as Highest-Paid D-I AD at $965,000, 
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/12
6729. 
 114. KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 10, at 17, 34. 
See infra Part VII for a discussion of potential antitrust law reforms that will enable the 
NCAA and its member institutions to address the increase in coaching salaries.
115. See KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 10, at 34. 
116. Id. at 41–47. 
117. See, e.g., Gilbert M. Gaul, Op-Ed., The Department of Lucrative Athletics, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2009, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/28/ 
opinion/28gaul.html?r=1&emc=eta1 (“Another key element fueling the arms race is the 
increasingly indefensible tax treatment of sports revenues.”). 
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federal taxation, from the Federal Unrelated Business Income Tax
(UBIT), or from both.118 
A.  Federal Tax Exemption 
Organizations described in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 
(I.R.C.) are exempt from the federal income tax.119  Organizations
qualifying for tax-exempt status also qualify under § 170 for deductibility
by individual taxpayers of contributions made to such organizations.120 
Section 501(c)(3) includes institutions that are organized and operated
exclusively for one or more of a number of specified purposes, two of 
which are education and the fostering of national or international amateur 
sports competition.121 
The Treasury Regulations (Regulations) provide some definitions and 
additional requirements for an organization to qualify for tax-exempt 
status under § 501(c)(3).  There are two separate tests that must be satisfied
independently: the “organizational test” and the “operational test.”122  If
an organization fails to meet either of those two tests, then it is not
exempt from federal income tax.123 
1.  The Organizational Test 
The organizational test requires that an organization’s articles of
organization meet two requirements: (1) they must limit the purpose of 
the organization to one or more of the exempt purposes listed in
§ 501(c)(3) of the I.R.C., and (2) they must not expressly empower the
organization to engage in activities that are not in furtherance of one or 
118. See, e.g., id. (“Congress essentially exempted colleges from paying taxes on
their sports income.  The legislators’ reasoning now appears shockingly quaint: that 
participation in college sports builds character and is an important component of the larger
college experience.”).
119. I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3) (2006). 
 120. Id. § 170 (2006). 
 121. Id. § 501(a), (c)(3).  Additionally, section 501(c)(3) requires that, generally, no
portion of the institution’s net earnings may inure to the benefit of any private individual, and
no substantial portion of the institution’s activities may be to carry on propaganda, to 
influence legislation, or to participate or intervene in any political campaign with regard 
to any candidate for public office.  Id. § 501(c)(3).
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a) (as amended in 2008). 
123. Id.
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more of such exempt purposes, unless such activities are an insubstantial 
part of the organization’s activities as a whole.124 
Colleges and universities can easily meet the organizational test by 
specifying in their articles of organization that they are organized 
exclusively for educational purposes.  The existence or extent of an athletic 
program operated by a college or university is thus not relevant to the 
issue of whether it meets this test. 
The NCAA’s primary organizational purpose is to “maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program 
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body.”125  The House
Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee both 
stated in 1950 that “[a]thletic activities of schools are substantially
related to [the] educational functions” of the institutions.126 Another of
the NCAA’s purposes is to “retain a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”127  As stated above, I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) includes institutions that are organized and operated exclusively 
“to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if
no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or
equipment).”128 The NCAA can easily meet the organizational test by
specifying in its articles of organization that it is organized exclusively 
for these purposes and any other purpose described in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
2.  The Operational Test
The operational test requires that an organization be operated
exclusively for one or more of the exempt purposes listed in § 501(c)(3) 
of the I.R.C.129  An organization will meet this requirement if it engages
primarily in activities that accomplish one or more of those purposes.130 An 
organization will not meet the requirement if “more than an insubstantial
part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.”131 An 
organization may operate a trade or business as a substantial part of its
activities and yet meet the requirements of § 501(c)(3) if “the operation 
of such trade or business is in furtherance of the organization’s exempt
 124. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2008). 
125. Letter from Myles Brand, President, NCAA, to William Thomas, Chairman, 
House Comm. on Ways and Means 3 (Nov. 13, 2006), available at http://www.ncaa.or
g/wps/wcm/connect/2fa84c004e0d90aea0caf01ad6fc8b25/20061115responsetohousecmmitt
eeonwaysandmeans.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=2fa84c004e0d90aea0caf01ad6fc8b25. 
 126. S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 29 (1950); H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 37 (1950). 
127. Letter from Myles Brand to William Thomas, supra note 125, at 5. 
128. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
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purpose or purposes and if the organization is not organized or operated
for the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business, as
defined in section 513” of the I.R.C.132  Determining the primary 
purpose for which an organization is organized requires an examination 
of all the circumstances involved, “including the size and extent of the 
trade or business and the size and extent of the activities which are in
furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.”133 
These requirements raise a threshold issue with regard to college and 
university athletic programs: is the operation of an athletic program a 
trade or business?  If so, additional questions remain.  Assuming that the 
operation of an athletic program constitutes a substantial part of a 
college or university’s activities, it must be determined whether the 
operation of such a program is in furtherance of a college or university’s
exempt purpose or purposes.  In addition, it must be determined whether
such a program constitutes an unrelated trade or business as defined in 
§ 513 of the I.R.C., and if so, whether the college or university is 
organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on such trade 
or business. 
The term trade or business is not specifically defined in the I.R.C. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that “to be engaged in a trade or business,
the taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and 
regularity and that the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the 
activity must be for income or profit.”134  Applying this test in a specific
case requires examining all the facts and circumstances.135  Although 
each college or university athletic program would thus have to be 
examined on the basis of its particular facts, it is generally assumed by 
many commentators that many such programs constitute a trade or 
business because they seek profit.136 
Is the operation of an athletic program in furtherance of a college or 
university’s exempt purpose?  As noted above, Congress stated in 1950 
 132. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (as amended in 2008). 
133. Id.
134. Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). 
135. Id. at 36. 
136. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College Athletics, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 109, 135–36; Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, the Student Athlete, and the
Professionalization of College Athletics, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 35, 48–49; Richard L. 
Kaplan, Intercollegiate Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1430, 1449 (1980); James L. Musselman, Recent Federal Income Tax Issues
Regarding Professional and Amateur Sports, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195, 205 (2003). 
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that “[a]thletic activities of schools are substantially related to [the] 
educational functions” of the institutions.137 Congress made that statement 
for the purpose of concluding that income from a basketball tournament 
is not subject to the UBIT.138  The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
issued several National Office Technical Advice Memoranda related to
application of the UBIT in which it discussed the close relationship of 
college athletics and education.139  In a 1980 revenue ruling, the IRS
stated that “[a]n athletic program is considered to be an integral part of
the educational process of a university, and activities providing 
necessary services to student athletes and coaches further the educational 
purposes of the university.”140 As discussed below, application of the
UBIT to a trade or business regularly carried on by an exempt
organization requires that the conduct of such trade or business not be
substantially related to the organization’s exercise or performance of its 
exempt function.141  Determining whether the operation of an athletic
program is “in furtherance of” a college or university’s exempt purpose 
would seem to require a lower standard than determining whether such a
program is “substantially related” to the organization’s exercise or 
performance of its exempt function.142  Although commentators have 
suggested that Congress reexamine its position with regard to application of
the UBIT to college and university athletic programs,143 no serious
argument has been made that such programs are not in furtherance of a 
college or university’s exempt purpose.144 
In addition to the requirement that a college or university’s athletic 
programs be in furtherance of its exempt purpose, the institution must
not be organized for the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated
trade or business.145  As stated above, determining the primary purpose
 137. S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 29 (1950); H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 37 (1950). 
 138. S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 29; H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 37. 
139. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-002 (Dec. 18, 1978); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-
51-004 (Aug. 21, 1978); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-005 (Sept. 24, 1978); I.R.S. Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 78-51-006 (Sept. 24, 1978). 
140. Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195; see also Rev. Rul. 80-295, 1980-2 C.B.
194. 
141. I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006). 
142. See Colombo, supra note 136, at 127–29 (discussing whether “in furtherance 
of” means the same as “substantially related” or whether it could be interpreted more
broadly to include an activity the revenue from which is used to further the 
organization’s charitable activities).
143. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 30, at 150–51. 
144. See Colombo, supra note 136, at 131 (stating that attacking the tax exemption
of a university or the NCAA in this manner would face substantial hurdles, but 
cautioning that the meaning of “in furtherance of” is not entirely clear).
145. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (as amended in 2008); see also Comm’r v.
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). 
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for which an organization is organized requires an examination of all the
circumstances involved, “including the size and extent of the trade or 
business and the size and extent of the activities which are in furtherance 
of one or more exempt purposes.”146 No serious argument could be
made that a college or university is organized or operated for the primary
purpose of carrying on its athletic program. 
Determining whether the NCAA satisfies the operational test requires 
a similar, albeit simpler, analysis.  Colleges and universities are organized 
exclusively for educational purposes and operate athletic programs in 
furtherance of those purposes, while the NCAA is organized primarily to 
“maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational
program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body.”147  The 
NCAA’s activities are thus entirely focused on intercollegiate athletics,
which both Congress and the IRS have concluded are substantially related 
to the educational functions of colleges and universities, as discussed
above, and clearly foster national and international sports competition.
All of the NCAA’s activities will thus be in furtherance of its exempt
purposes so long as the activities are related to intercollegiate athletics.
The NCAA periodically engages in activities that most assuredly constitute 
the conduct of a trade or business.  A prime example is the NCAA basketball 
tournament held every year in March, which generates significant 
revenue.148  The operation of any such trade or business, however, will 
almost certainly be in furtherance of the NCAA’s exempt purpose;
sponsoring an intercollegiate basketball tournament, for example, 
undoubtedly furthers the purpose of maintaining intercollegiate athletics 
as an integral part of the educational program.  In addition, any such 
trade or business will not constitute an unrelated trade or business as
defined in § 513 of the I.R.C. because it will be directly related to 
intercollegiate athletics, and the NCAA is not organized or operated for
the primary purpose of carrying on any such trade or business. 
3.  Other Requirements
Two other issues are potentially relevant with regard to whether a 
college or university operating an athletic program qualifies for tax-
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1). 
147. Letter from Myles Brand to William Thomas, supra note 125, at 3. 
148. See Morgan, supra note 30, at 168. 
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exempt status under § 501(c)(3): the “private inurement” and “private 
benefit” limitations. 
i.  Private Inurement
Section 501(c)(3) provides that “no part of the net earnings of . . . [an
exempt organization shall inure] to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual.”149  This language has been interpreted “as prohibiting a
‘siphoning off’ of the assets of an exempt organization to an
‘insider.’”150  This could occur by an exempt organization paying an
unreasonable salary to an insider, thereby paying more than fair market
value for the services that the insider provided in exchange for such
salary.151 
The issue that has been occasionally debated with regard to college
and university athletic programs is whether the compensation packages
awarded to football and basketball coaches by some schools have 
become sufficiently excessive so as to violate this limitation.152  There is
no real issue here for two principal reasons.  First, Congress changed the 
law in 1996 by enacting § 4958 of the I.R.C.,153 which imposes excise
taxes on certain private inurement transactions.  The result has been that 
private “inurement transactions are almost exclusively dealt with via the
excise taxes imposed by that Section, as opposed to withdrawal of
exemption.”154  Second, in determining whether an exempt organization
is paying an unreasonable amount of compensation to an insider, thereby 
violating § 4958, the Regulations provide that “the ‘reasonableness’ of
[such] compensation [be] measured by what the market is paying for 
similar services including the for-profit market.”155  This allows for the 
compensation of college coaches to be compared to the compensation of 
coaches in the professional leagues to determine what is reasonable.156 
As a consequence, it has not been seriously argued that the tax
exemption of a college or university is at risk under the private inurement
limitation based on the amount of compensation it pays its coaches. 
149. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
 150. Colombo, supra note 136, at 120. 
151. Id.
152. Id. at 120–21. 
153. I.R.C. § 4958 (2006). 
 154. Colombo, supra note 136, at 120.  Revocation of exemption could still be 
utilized as a sanction for violation of § 4958 if such violation was sufficiently egregious.  
Id. at 120 n.50 (citing Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(f) (as amended 2008)). 
155. Id. at 121 (citing Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(A) (2002)). 
156. Id.
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ii.  Private Benefit 
The Regulations pursuant to § 501(c)(3) provide that to qualify for
exemption, “it is necessary for an organization to establish that it is not 
organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as 
designated individuals, . . . shareholders of the organization, or persons 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.”157  These 
provisions have been interpreted to mean that “an organization can lose
its exemption if, as a result of serving its charitable class, it confers an
excessive benefit . . . on parties outside of the charitable class.”158  Although 
this limitation seems somewhat similar to the private inurement
limitation, “[t]he primary differences between [these two limitations] are 
that the private benefit doctrine (1) can apply to transactions with 
‘outsiders’ (that is, independent parties who have no influence over the 
charity), and (2) can apply even to transactions entered into at fair 
market value.”159 
The private benefit limitation has been described as “a quintessential 
balancing test in which the benefits to private individuals or organizations
as a result of a particular activity must be weighed against the charitable
benefits the activity produces.”160  If a transaction is structured such that 
it appears to excessively favor private interests, it will violate this 
limitation even though it also serves the charitable class.161 
The issue with regard to athletic programs of colleges and universities 
is whether those organizations, along with the NCAA, “provide 
excessive private benefit to television networks and the professional 
sports leagues in comparison to the educational benefits provided to the 
charitable class (i.e., the participating student-athletes).”162  The argument is
that both television networks and professional sports leagues receive
substantial benefits from colleges’ and universities’ athletic programs. 
The television networks benefit in the form of profit when they televise 
college games. The professional sports leagues benefit in two ways:
(1) by effectively utilizing colleges’ and universities’ athletic programs 
157. Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008). 
 158. Colombo, supra note 136, at 122. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 124. 
161. Id.
162. Id. at 125. 
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for training and development and (2) by avoiding the cost of maintaining 
those programs directly.163 
Professor Colombo acknowledges that this argument “seems plausible 
given the extraordinarily broad scope of the private benefit doctrine” but 
concludes that it seems highly unlikely to succeed.164  He points out that
the IRS has “never shown any inclination to apply the doctrine in this 
manner.”165  In addition, he asserts that “the NCAA can legitimately 
argue that it tries to keep its distance, and tries to distance college athletes 
from the pro leagues,” and notes that “the NCAA was not started by the 
professional sports leagues as a means of sloughing off their training 
costs to an exempt organization.”166  Finally, he argues that the television 
contracts entered into by the NCAA seem fairly negotiated, and there is
no evidence that “the NCAA or universities negligently or intentionally
‘underpriced’ their product to give a bigger profit margin to the 
networks.”167 
In conclusion, it has not been seriously argued that because colleges 
and universities operate athletic programs they are not organizations 
described in § 501(c)(3) of the I.R.C. and are thus not exempt from the
federal income tax, no matter how extensive and profitable those 
programs may be.  Likewise, there has been no serious argument that the 
NCAA does not qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3).168 
B.  Unrelated Business Income Tax
1.  Current Status of the Law 
Prior to enactment of the UBIT in 1950, funds received by colleges
and universities from any source were sheltered from taxation under the 
institution’s general tax exemption.169  Until Congress enacted the UBIT, 
the law “‘recognized only two possibilities—an organization was either 
entirely taxable or entirely tax-exempt.’”170 As a result, the courts
generally treated activities conducted by colleges and universities as tax-
exempt regardless of whether those activities were in any way related to
163. Id.
164. Id. at 125–26. 
165. Id. at 125. 
166. Id. at 126. 
167. Id.
168. See id. at 134 (concluding that withdrawing the tax-exempt status of the 
NCAA, or of colleges and universities because of their athletic programs, is a near impossibility 
under current law). 
 169. Musselman, supra note 136, at 203–04. 
170. Id. at 204 (quoting Kaplan, supra note 136, at 1433). 
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the exempt purpose of the institution.171  This led colleges and universities
to conclude that they could engage in business activities totally unrelated
to their exempt purpose and enjoy a significant competitive advantage 
because their profits were exempt from tax.  A famous example was
New York University’s ownership of the C.F. Mueller Company, a leading 
macaroni producer.  When the IRS attempted to tax the company’s profits, 
New York University successfully argued that the profits were exempt
from tax on the basis of its general tax exemption.172  Congress became 
concerned that the government was losing significant tax revenue from 
these business operations173 and that business entities not owned by 
colleges and universities were suffering from unfair competition.174  The
ultimate result was enactment of the UBIT. 
The UBIT imposes a tax, at rates applicable to taxable corporations, 
on the unrelated business taxable income (UBTI) of most tax-exempt 
organizations, including those described in § 501(c)(3) of the I.R.C.175 
In addition, public universities are specifically subjected to the UBIT.176 
UBTI is generally defined as the “gross income . . . [of] any organization
from any unrelated trade or business . . . regularly carried on by [such
organization], less [certain] deductions allowed . . . which are directly
connected with the carrying on of such trade or business.”177 
This definition requires the determination of three issues: (1) whether 
an activity is a trade or business, (2) whether it is regularly carried on, 
and (3) whether it is an unrelated trade or business.  Although § 513 of 
the I.R.C. specifically defines the term trade or business for purposes of
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See id.  In congressional hearings considering enactment of the UBIT, Representative 
Dingell stated that “[e]ventually all the noodles produced in this country will be
produced by corporations held or created by universities . . . and there will be no revenue 
to the Federal Treasury from this industry.” Revenue Revision of 1950: Hearings Before 
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 81st Cong. 580 (1950) (remarks of Rep. John Dingell). 
 174. Musselman, supra note 136, at 204–05.  In his 1950 message to Congress, 
President Truman stated that “an exemption intended to protect educational activities has
been misused in a few instances to gain competitive advantage over private enterprise
through the conduct of business and industrial operations entirely unrelated to educational 
activities.”  96 CONG. REC. 769, 771 (1950) (message from President Harry S. Truman). 
175. I.R.C. § 511(a) (2006); Musselman, supra note 136, at 204–05. 
176. I.R.C. § 511(a)(2)(b). 
 177. Id. § 512(a)(1) (2006); see also Musselman, supra note 136, at 205 n.68 (citing 
§ 512(a)(1) (“Gross income and deductions are both computed with the modifications 
provided in section 512(b).”)). 
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the UBIT,178 the Treasury Regulations clarify that such term has the
identical meaning given it by the Supreme Court for purposes of § 162 
of the I.R.C.179  As discussed above, although each college or university
athletic program would have to be examined on the basis of its particular
facts, it is generally assumed by commentators that many college and 
university athletic programs constitute trades or businesses because they
seek profit.180 
The Regulations provide some guidance regarding whether an activity 
is regularly carried on.  Generally, activities of tax-exempt organizations 
“will ordinarily be deemed to be regularly carried on if they manifest a 
frequency and continuity, and are pursued in a manner, generally similar 
to comparable commercial activities of nonexempt organizations.”181 
Trade or business activities that are customarily carried on during a 
particular season will be treated as regularly carried on if they are 
conducted by an exempt organization during a significant portion of the 
season.182  The Regulations cite, as an example, operation of a horse-
racing track, which is customarily carried on only during a particular 
season.183  Athletic programs presumably would be treated similarly 
because they are customarily seasonal in nature.  It is generally assumed 
by commentators that athletic programs of colleges and universities are 
regularly carried on as the Regulations define that term.184  As stated
above, the NCAA periodically engages in activities that undoubtedly
constitute the conduct of a trade or business, such as the NCAA 
basketball tournament held every year in March.185  It is also generally 
assumed that those business activities are regularly carried on within the 
meaning of the Regulations.186 
178. I.R.C. § 513(c) (2006). 
179. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended in 1983).  See supra notes 134–36 and
accompanying text for the meaning of the term “trade or business” for purposes of 
I.R.C. § 162. 
180. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1983). 
 182. Id. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 1983). 
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 136, at 50; Musselman, supra note 136, at 206–07. 
185. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
186. See Colombo, supra note 136, at 135–36; Jensen, supra note 136, at 48–49; 
Kaplan, supra note 136, at 1449–50; Musselman, supra note 136, at 206–07; cf. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Comm’r, 914 F.2d 1417, 1422 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Although 
sponsorship of a college basketball tournament and attendant circulation of programs are
seasonal events, the trade or business of selling advertisements is not.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  In this case, the court ruled that advertising revenue earned by the NCAA
from the semifinal and final rounds of the Men’s Division I Basketball Championship 
was not subject to the UBIT because the advertising activity conducted by the NCAA 
was not regularly carried on.  Id.  The court stressed that advertising was the applicable 
activity in question, rather than organizing and operating the annual basketball tournament, 
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In enacting the UBIT, Congress intended to address its concerns that 
colleges and universities conducting trades or businesses deprived the 
government of significant tax revenue from those business operations, 
and enjoyed an unfair competitive advantage over commercial business 
entities required to pay taxes on their income.187  Congress could have
satisfied those concerns by providing that all trades or businesses
conducted by exempt organizations would be subject to the income tax
laws in the same manner as commercial business entities.  Instead,
Congress balanced those concerns against the basic policy for exempting
certain organizations from the income tax by providing that an exempt
organization would be taxed only on income from trades or businesses
that are unrelated to its exempt purpose. 
Whether an activity is an unrelated trade or business is a difficult issue
and has, in recent years, become more controversial with regard to 
college and university athletic programs.  The I.R.C. defines an unrelated 
trade or business as “any trade or business [of a tax-exempt organization,] 
the conduct of which is not substantially related . . . to the [organization’s]
exercise or performance . . . of its [exempt] . . . function.”188 The
Regulations provide that a trade or business is substantially related to an
organization’s exempt purposes if “the production or distribution of the 
goods or the performance of the services from which the gross income is 
derived . . . contribute importantly to the accomplishment of those 
purposes.”189 Resolution of this issue “depends in each case upon the
facts and circumstances involved.”190  An important factor is the “size
and extent of the activities involved” in operating the trade or business 
compared to the “nature and extent of the exempt function which they
purport to serve.”191  Thus, if the trade or business is “conducted on a
larger scale than is reasonably necessary for performance of” the
organization’s exempt functions, “the gross income attributable to that 
portion of the activities in excess of the needs of exempt functions
because advertising was the activity that the Commissioner contended was producing 
UBIT.  Id. 
187. See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text. 
188. I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006). 
189. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1983). 
190. Id.
191. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3) (as amended in 1983). 
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constitutes gross income from the conduct of [an] unrelated trade or 
business.”192 
In congressional hearings considering enactment of the UBIT, the 
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee 
both concluded that “income of an educational organization from 
[admission] to football games” is not subject to the UBIT because
“[a]thletic activities of schools are substantially related to [the]
educational functions” of those institutions.193  This language has essentially 
given colleges and universities a free pass under the UBIT with regard to
their athletic programs.194  The IRS made a run at college athletics in 1977, 
asserting that revenue from the broadcasting rights to the Cotton Bowl
football game were subject to the UBIT.195  The IRS received a significantly 
negative reaction from the public to that attempt and, in 1978, retracted
its earlier position through a series of unpublished Technical Advice 
Memoranda.  These memoranda discussed the close relationship of college
athletics and education while favorably comparing in-person viewing of
a game with exhibition of the same game on television to a much larger 
audience.196  In addition, the IRS issued two revenue rulings in 1980 
consistent with its new position on this issue,197 stating in one such ruling 
that “[a]n athletic program is considered to be an integral part of the 
educational process of a university, and activities providing necessary
services to student athletes and coaches further the educational purposes 
of the university.”198 
2.  Should Congress Change the Law? 
In spite of such stalwart support on the part of both Congress and the 
IRS for exemption from the UBIT of college and university athletic 
programs, some commentators assert that Congress should reexamine its 
conclusive statement that “[a]thletic activities of schools are substantially
related to [the] educational functions”199 of those institutions.200 For 
192. Id.
 193. S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 29 (1950); H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 37 (1950). 
194. See Jensen, supra note 136, at 51; Musselman, supra note 136, at 207. 
195. See Jensen, supra note 136, at 51 n.68; Musselman, supra note 136, at 207. 
196. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-002 (Dec. 18, 1978); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 
78-51-004 (Aug. 21, 1978); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-005 (Sept. 24, 1978); see 
Jensen, supra note 136, at 51–52, nn.68–69 & 73; Musselman, supra note 136, at 207. 
197. Rev. Rul. 80-295, 1980-2 C.B. 194; Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195. 
198. Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195. 
 199. S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 29 (1950); H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 37 (1950). 
200. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 30, at 176–77; see also FRANK G. SPLITT, Why 
the U.S. Should Intervene in College Sports, in  ESSAYS & COMMENTARIES ON COLLEGE 
SPORTS REFORM 5, 5–6 (2005), available at http://www.thedrakegroup.org/Splitt_Essays
.pdf  (“An in-depth IRS audit could turn this economic tide and fully expose the NCAA 
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example, Gabriel Morgan argued that college and university athletic 
programs have become commercial enterprises that are independent of 
and detached from the institution, and have departed from the
educational standards and values of the colleges and universities that
sponsor them.201  He believes that the extreme commerciality of these
programs jeopardizes the education of the student-athletes and the
financial security of the university,202 and that the programs “actually 
hinder the development of student-athletes’ academic capabilities in
their quests for athletic victory and its accompanying revenue.”203 
Morgan proposes that the best solution is to eliminate the congressional 
presumption that college and university athletic programs are substantially
related to the educational purposes of those institutions.204  Morgan  
offers three justifications for this proposition.  First, he asserts that there 
is no historical justification for any such presumption.205  He supports
this assertion by discussing the primal stages of American intercollegiate 
athletics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and their 
independence from the colleges and universities with which they were 
associated.206  In the beginning, college and university “administrations
considered intercollegiate athletics wholly unrelated to a student’s
academic pursuits.”207  It was not until the founding of the NCAA in the
early twentieth century that colleges and universities asserted control 
over their athletic programs “by integrating them into newly created
physical education departments,” and the purpose of that decision was
not to establish a relationship between academics and athletics, but 
rather to assert control over intercollegiate football and its “run-away
violence.”208 This argument does nothing more than establish that
American intercollegiate athletics began in the nineteenth century in a 
very primitive form and gradually evolved into its modern day structure.
It is of no assistance in determining whether there should presently be a 
cartel’s Achilles’ heel—the extremely weak educational basis for the current financial
structure of big-time college sports.”).  Although Splitt, who is a member of The Drake 
Group, makes this bald assertion, he offers no legal justification for it. See id.
201. See Morgan, supra note 30, at 176. 
202. Id. at 176–77. 
203. Id. at 178. 
204. Id. at 179. 
205. Id.
206. See id. at 179–80. 
207. Id. at 179. 
208. Id. at 180. 
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presumption that college and university athletic programs are substantially 
related to educational purposes.
Morgan’s second justification for eliminating the congressional
presumption is the commerciality of intercollegiate athletics and its focus on
the generation of revenue.209  He believes such a focus “undermines the
academic and financial integrity of both the athletic department and its
university.”210 He cites the introduction of television as the gateway that
ultimately led to today’s multibillion-dollar broadcasting contracts,
multimillion-dollar compensation packages for coaches, and the pressurized 
environment created by the need to remain competitive and maximize 
revenue, resulting in an overemphasis of athletic success and revenue 
and the devaluation of education.211 
This premise is the subject of much debate.  University administrators 
assert that the success of university athletic programs translates to
“increased applications to the university, superior student bodies, and 
increased alumni donations.”212  Morgan cites to studies that support
“the notion that the success of a university’s athletic department causes
an increase in applicants to the university”213 but asserts that the data
“failed to conclusively prove any relationship between athletic success 
and the academic quality of an incoming freshman class.”214  He  
concludes that “the notion that athletic success generates indirect
educational value by increasing the quality of the student body is [thus] 
unsubstantiated.”215  One could also conclude from that data that the
university administrators could perhaps be correct on that point.  Even if
there is no relationship whatsoever between a successful athletic
program and the academic quality of an incoming class, increasing 
applications to the university by itself constitutes a significant achievement
relating to the educational mission of the university.  Colleges and
universities constantly look for ways to increase their applicant pools for 
reasons other than increasing the academic statistics of the entering 
class; a common example is to diversify a university’s student body. 
Morgan also cites to a letter written to Myles Brand, president of the 
NCAA, from Representative William Thomas, Chairman of the House 
Ways and Means Committee, for the proposition that the “federal 
government’s purpose in granting tax exemption to universities is to
further education in general, not to increase the recognition, reputation 
209. Id. at 181.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 181–82. 
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or relative quality of one individual institution.”216  Morgan’s argument 
that academic success does not indirectly increase the quality of a
university’s student body presumes that the national applicant pool is 
finite and competition among colleges and universities for those 
applicants is a zero-sum game.  On the contrary, a much more logical 
presumption is that college and university athletic competition generally
attracts a significant number of applicants with a high interest in
athletics who would not otherwise be interested in attending college. 
As to the assertion by university administrators that successful university
athletic programs result in increased alumni donations, Morgan cites to
studies that have shown varying results.  Morgan points out that some
“studies found no relationship between alumni donations and athletic 
success, others found a statistically significant relationship, and others 
found a relationship between athletic success and athletic donations.”217 
Morgan also concludes that whether there is, in fact, a correlation between 
successful programs and increased donations is irrelevant because athletic
programs are not always successful and thus at times fail to attract a high 
level of donations.218  According to Morgan, the overall result is that
very few programs are profitable and “can have tangible and deleterious 
effects on the financial and educational interests of a university.”219 If it 
is true that very few athletic programs are profitable, it is difficult to 
understand, as discussed more fully below, why subjecting college and 
university athletic programs to the UBIT will have any effect whatsoever 
on the manner in which such programs are conducted.220  Aside from
that observation, it is not difficult to understand why a college or university
would seek to maximize alumni donations from whatever source
possible to further its educational goals.  If increased donations are made
to the university’s general fund, the educational benefits are obvious. 
Even if the increased donations are made only to the athletic programs,
educational benefits to the university will result.  As donations increase,
the university will be able to increase the quality and breadth of the 
programs, resulting in an increase in the quality and reputation of the 
university.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 184 (internal citations omitted). 
 218. See id.
219. Id. at 184–85. 
220. See infra text accompanying notes 237–43. 
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The case studies previously described in Part IV are illustrative of the 
tremendous benefits, educational and otherwise, that colleges and
universities have received by increasing the quality of their athletic
programs.  As discussed above, such benefits include attracting high-
quality faculty and students, generating donations and enrichment, 
reconfiguring their campus identities, and enhancing institutional
political clout.221  Whether the athletic programs are profitable or not is
of no consequence; there is no distinction between funding an athletic 
department and any other department of the university.  A college or 
university, in its normal budgeting process, will allocate its resources based 
on each department’s need for funds, balanced against the institution’s 
overall objectives and goals. 
Morgan’s third justification for eliminating the congressional 
presumption is that the academic integrity of colleges and universities 
will be sacrificed “by recruiting, admitting, keeping eligible, and
graduating talented athletes who are unqualified for the academic rigors 
of college-level curricula,” thereby undermining the educational purpose 
of the institution.222  In support of this premise, he cites to sources
asserting that student-athletes who do not satisfy the academic criteria
established for students in general are often recruited and admitted,
athletic departments have developed strategies to enable student-athletes
to remain eligible in their sport in spite of their lack of motivation and 
academic ability, and graduation rates for student-athletes are significantly 
below those for the student body as a whole.223  He asserts that these 
issues persist in spite of regulatory attempts at reform by the NCAA224 
and that they result in damage to “the intellectual ethos of a campus” and
to “the educational goals of a university.”225 
Student-athletes are not the only group who is recruited and admitted
with lower academic statistical qualifications, is the target of strategies 
designed to assist the group in meeting academic performance standards 
as students, and graduates at lower rates than the student body as a
whole.  Admitting an entering class with the highest possible admission 
statistics is not the sole goal of a college admissions office.  Every 
college and university, for example, allocates substantial resources to
achieve and maintain a diverse student body, and virtually everyone 
agrees that accomplishing that goal significantly improves the educational
environment of the institution.  If athletic programs are in fact related to
221. 
 222. Morgan, supra note 30, at 186. 
223. 
See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
Id. at 172–75. 
224. Id. at 173–76. 
225. Id. at 187. 
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the educational purposes of colleges and universities, recruiting student-
athletes to participate in such programs and assisting them in meeting
academic performance standards are appropriate activities in which 
colleges and universities should engage.  Some of the students who are 
recruited and admitted for the purpose of achieving a diverse student 
body would not have been given the opportunity to attend college if not 
for the diversity they bring to campus; likewise, some students would
not be given the opportunity to attend college if they were not athletes. 
Morgan suggests that nonathlete applicants who are more academically 
qualified are rejected for admission so that athletically gifted student-
athletes can be admitted, resulting in “the inefficient use of scarce 
academic resources” because the nonathlete applicants “would have 
taken greater advantage of the academic resources offered by the 
university.”226  That is the same flawed argument used by opponents of 
diversity admissions programs.  Academic statistics based on standardized
test scores and high school grades are merely guidelines that college 
admissions offices use to predict how well a student may perform in
college.  Many other factors contribute to a student’s ultimate performance, 
such as maturity level, hard work, and determination.  College students 
often perform at a higher or lower level than their academic statistics
predict.  In addition, if admissions were based solely on the basis of
academic statistics, applicants who would be accepted in place of the 
student-athletes would have the lowest academic statistics in the entering 
class; even if academic statistics were perfectly predictive, which they
are certainly not, those applicants would not perform significantly better 
than the student-athletes. 
An additional weakness with Morgan’s third justification for eliminating 
the congressional presumption is that it is largely based on debatable 
assumptions and statistics.  For example, statistics comparing the graduation 
rates of student-athletes with the student body as a whole have been
hotly contested.  In his response to Representative William Thomas,
Myles Brand reported graduation rate statistics that were significantly 
different than those cited by Morgan,227 and he challenged the assumption 
that student-athletes do not satisfy the academic criteria established for
226. Id.
227. Compare id. at 188 (“[W]ithin NCAA Division I, men’s basketball programs 
average a 44 percentage graduation rate . . . .”), with Letter from Myles Brand to William
Thomas, supra note 125, at 12–13 (“[T]he more accurate graduation rate for Division I 
male basketball student-athletes is 59 percent.”). 
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students in general by asserting that Division I scholarship student-
athletes, on average, have higher SAT scores and high school grade point 
averages than college students as a whole.228 
Morgan’s proposal is to eliminate the congressional presumption that
college and university athletic programs are substantially related to the 
educational purposes of those institutions and replace it with a case-by-
case factual inquiry into whether an athletic program of a particular
college or university is substantially related to the educational purpose of 
the institution.229  He suggests factors that should be used to make that
determination.  First, he states that “the number, recency, and severity of 
NCAA or institutional rule infractions will be relevant.”230  It is unclear
exactly how rule infractions committed by an athletic program could be 
relevant in determining whether the program is substantially related to 
the educational purpose of the college or university, and he does not 
offer any explanation of that statement. 
His second and third factors require comparing the academic
performance and graduation rates of an athletic department’s student-
athletes with those of the general student body.231  He asserts that if the
grade point averages and graduation rates of student-athletes are 
significantly lower than those of the student body as a whole, “it is 
unlikely that education is being enriched through participation in athletics,”
and the athletic departments of those institutions “are not contributing 
importantly to the furtherance of education.”232  This conclusion massively 
overstates the significance of academic performance of student-athletes to
the question of whether a college or university’s athletic programs contribute
importantly to the accomplishment of the institution’s educational purposes.
As previously discussed, colleges and universities receive substantial
benefits, educational and otherwise, from maintaining high-quality athletic 
programs.233 Although the academic performance of an institution’s
student-athletes is somewhat relevant to the relationship of its athletic 
programs to its educational purpose and mission, it is just one factor, no
more or less important than the many others discussed above. 
Morgan’s fourth suggested factor is based on a flawed application of
the Regulations.  This factor relates to a statement made in the Regulations 
with regard to determining whether a trade or business is substantially
related to an organization’s exempt purposes: if the trade or business is
228. Letter from Myles Brand to William Thomas, supra note 125, at 10. 
 229. Morgan, supra note 30, at 189. 
230. Id. at 191. 
231. Id.
232. Id. at 191–92. 
233. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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“conducted on a larger scale than is reasonably necessary for performance
of” the organization’s exempt functions, “the gross income attributable 
to that portion of the activities in excess of the needs of exempt functions
constitutes gross income from the conduct of [an] unrelated trade or 
business.”234  He misapplies the Regulations by taking that sentence out
of context to conclude that if an athletic program generates excessive
profit it is being conducted on a larger scale than is reasonably necessary
for performance of the college or university’s educational functions, and 
thus is not substantially related to the institution’s exempt purpose.235 
Morgan’s emphasis on an athletic program’s generation of profit in
applying these Regulations is misguided.  A more complete discussion
of those Regulations allows for an accurate analysis.  The sentence in the 
Regulations immediately prior to the statement used by Morgan in his 
fourth factor states that, in determining whether a trade or business is
substantially related to an organization’s exempt purposes, an important
factor is the “size and extent of the activities involved” in operating the
trade or business compared to the “nature and extent of the exempt
function which they purport to serve.”236  Next comes the statement used
by Morgan: if the trade or business is “conducted on a larger scale than 
is reasonably necessary for performance of” the organization’s exempt 
functions, “the gross income attributable to that portion of the activities 
in excess of the needs of exempt functions constitutes gross income from 
the conduct of [an] unrelated trade or business.”237  The Regulations are
clearly discussing the activities involved in the trade or business, not the 
profit generated by such trade or business.  The Regulations give no 
guidance on the question of when a trade or business is considered to be 
conducted on a larger scale than is reasonably necessary for performance 
of the organization’s exempt functions.  If athletic programs are in fact
related to the educational purposes of colleges and universities, it is 
difficult to imagine how the size and extent of the activities involved in 
conducting an athletic program could be greater than is reasonably
necessary for performance of an institution’s educational function. 
At best, these recent appeals to Congress to subject college and 
university athletic programs to the UBIT appear to be a cry for increased
234. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3) (as amended in 1983). 
 235. Morgan, supra note 30, at 192. 
236. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3). 
237. Id.
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and more effective regulations of such programs by the NCAA.  At 
worst, these appeals are red herrings aimed at gaining leverage in a quest 
to diminish the ever-widening influence of intercollegiate athletics in the 
world of higher education.  Morgan, for example, asserts that “the
NCAA has neither the power nor the ability to directly regulate the 
economic activities of its member institutions.”238  He argues that the
threat of potential tax liability under the UBIT will incentivize athletic 
departments to recruit and admit student-athletes with adequate academic
credentials and ensure that its student-athletes academically perform at a
satisfactory level and graduate from the institution.239 Congress did not
intend for the UBIT to be a regulatory device for college or university 
athletic programs or for any other exempt organization.  On the contrary,
as explained in Part VI.B.1 above, it was intended to address
congressional concerns that colleges and universities conducting trades 
or businesses were able to deprive the government of significant tax 
revenue from those business operations and  enjoy an unfair competitive 
advantage over commercial business entities required to pay taxes on 
their income.240  Moreover, the UBIT would be horrendously inefficient
as a means of regulating those programs.
There is probably universal agreement that college and university 
athletic programs are in need of reform, and most would probably agree 
that the most competitive and profitable programs are in need of more 
effective regulation than they currently receive.  But that falls far short 
of concluding that any programs currently in existence are not 
substantially related to the college or university’s educational purpose.
It would be difficult to envision an athletic program that would be so 
devoid of educational value that it would not contribute importantly to
the educational purpose of a college or university.  For that to be the 
case, the athletic program would have to be conducted similar to a 
professional sports franchise, with virtually no regard given to education 
of its student-athletes.  No athletic program would be allowed to go that 
far if appropriate and effective regulation is administered by the NCAA.
Part VII of this Article proposes an alternative means of congressional
legislative reform to ensure that no college or university athletic program 
becomes so unrelated to the educational purposes of the institution that it 
would become subject to the UBIT. 
 238. Morgan, supra note 30, at 196. 
239. Id. at 195–96. 
240. See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Policy Analysis
A recent article by Professor John Colombo proposes a different
approach.  Professor Colombo agrees that the current state of the law
precludes withdrawal of the “tax exemption from either the NCAA or
the individual universities that conduct Division I football and basketball 
programs,”241 and precludes application of the UBIT to the NCAA or to
college and university athletic programs.  In addition, Colombo presents 
an insightful and well-documented argument that subjecting those 
institutions to the UBIT would make no difference, other than forcing 
them to incur significant additional expenditures to comply with the law,
because there would ultimately be no net revenue to tax.242  The NCAA
distributes all its net revenue to member schools; those distributions 
would likely be a deductible expense for tax purposes, leaving little or
no unrelated taxable business income that would be subject to the UBIT
even if Congress somehow changed the law to make the UBIT applicable
to the NCAA.243  Similarly, most athletic programs of colleges and
universities are not profitable, and the few programs that currently show 
a profit do so in large part because those colleges and universities have
no existing incentive to utilize rigorous cost accounting principles with 
respect to those programs.244  Application of these principles requires 
proper allocation of costs to each athletic program for its share of capital
expenditures for buildings and equipment, maintenance of facilities,
employee costs, and the like.245  Professor Colombo cites to James 
Shulman and William Bowen for their conclusion “that if capital costs 
are properly accounted for, no program would show an actual net profit 
for accounting purposes.”246  In addition, if an individual program
showed a profit even after proper application of cost-accounting principles,
it would not require very sophisticated tax-planning methodologies to
eliminate any unrelated business taxable income that might result.  As
aptly stated by Professor Colombo, “I doubt that the general counsel of, 
 241. Colombo, supra note 136, at 134. 
242. Id. at 143. 
243. Id.
244. Id. at 143–44. 
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE:
COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES 250 (2001)). 
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say, the University of Michigan would cower much in the face of a
threat by the IRS to apply the UBIT to Michigan’s football program.”247 
Colombo nevertheless proposes that Congress change the law despite
his conclusions that the law currently precludes withdrawal of the tax
exemption from the NCAA or universities conducting athletic programs, 
precludes applications of the UBIT to the NCAA or those programs, and 
that subjecting those institutions to the UBIT would make no difference 
because there would ultimately be no net revenue to tax.248  He justifies
his proposals by asserting that “big-time college athletics does not fit
any of the theoretical explanations for tax exemption and does fit within
the rationales for applying the UBIT,” and concludes that revenues from 
college and university athletic programs should thus be taxed as a matter 
of tax policy.249 
Professor Colombo acknowledges that “there is no clearly defined 
underlying theory for why we grant tax exemption to the broad range of 
organizations that claim charitable status”250 but then discusses the
various theories that have been offered over the years by academics and 
tax theorists to possibly justify such treatment and concludes that “big-
time college athletics appears to fail under all of them.”251  The theories
he discusses all make various assumptions: examples include the role
charities should play in society and behavioral characteristics of individuals, 
organizations, and government and their responsiveness to various 
stimuli.252  Needless to say, the hypotheses posited by these theorists are
highly speculative and subject to disagreement.  In addition, Professor
Colombo recognizes that under current law it makes no practical difference 
whether these theories support tax exemption for college or university
athletic programs because “tax exemption is applied to entities, not to 
individual activities of entities,” and all such athletic programs constitute 
only a relatively minor portion of the activities of the college or university
operating them.253 
As explained by Professor Colombo, “the UBIT was enacted precisely 
to handle this kind of situation . . . to tax revenues from commercial 
activities undertaken by an otherwise exempt charity.”254  He describes 
the two principal justifications for adoption by Congress of the UBIT:
“protecting the corporate tax base,” which he believes is the most
 247. Colombo, supra note 136, at 145. 
248. See id. at 144–46. 
249. Id. at 146. 
250. Id. at 147. 
251. Id. at 148. 
252. See id. at 147–48. 
253. Id. at 150. 
254. Id.
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important, and “avoiding ‘unfair competition’ between charities and for-
profit service providers.”255  He also describes two “policy concerns,”
one of which is to limit “the extent to which the attention of charitable 
managers is diverted from their core charitable mission to for-profit 
empire building.”256  He asserts that “[g]iving Division I football and 
basketball revenues a pass under the UBIT clearly offends the corporate 
tax base protection and diversionary concerns.”257 
Professor Colombo recognizes that little or no tax revenue would be 
collected by subjecting college and university athletic programs to the 
UBIT because “it is likely that only a few of these programs would show
a taxable profit after applying rigorous tax-accounting policies to their 
income and expenses.”258  As a result, it is difficult to understand how 
the corporate tax base could be at risk.  Colombo nevertheless insists 
that his point is valid.  He uses as an example the U.S. auto industry and 
asserts that automakers should not receive a tax exemption simply
because in recent years they have been unprofitable: “the theoretical tax
base should include operations by auto manufacturers, and the potential
for future profit cannot be ignored.”259  But an industry that is unprofitable
in some years and profitable in others is clearly distinguishable from 
college and university athletic programs that, as Professor Colombo
readily admits, will never show a profit. 
As to Colombo’s diversionary concern, that theory is highly speculative 
and subject to disagreement.  To the extent it has any validity, he fails to 
adequately explain how current law offends the theory.  He baldly
asserts that college and university athletic programs “may be the best
example of how a significant commercial activity diverts the attention of 
charitable management from their core charitable program to the needs 
of the commercial business.”260  To support this assertion, Colombo argues
that coaches are hired at increasingly exorbitant salaries to win games
rather than provide education, substantial amounts of financial resources 
255. Id. at 151.  Colombo explains that “economists almost uniformly have rejected 
the notion that charities engage in ‘unfair competition,’ at least if one defines the term as 
some sort of predatory pricing or predatory market entry or expansion.”  Id.  For a more 
complete discussion of Congress’s justification for adopting the UBIT, see supra Part 
VI.B.
256. Colombo, supra note 136, at 151. 
257. Id.
258. Id. at 152 n.184. 
259. Id.
260. Id. at 153. 
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are spent on athletic training facilities and stadiums at the expense of the 
educational environment of the institution, and university administrators 
spend substantial amounts of time and money dealing with recruiting 
violations instead of educational endeavors.261  Those arguments are
mostly conclusory and highly speculative. 
Based on his conclusions that “big-time college athletics does not fit 
any of the theoretical explanations for tax exemption and does fit within
the rationales for applying the UBIT,”262 Professor Colombo proposes
that Congress should (1) “require that a certain percentage of revenues 
from revenue-producing sports such as football and basketball be used to
expand nonrevenue athletic opportunities”;263 (2) impose “targeted 
expenditure limits, such as capping coaches’ salaries or limiting annual 
expenditures on recruiting or sports facilities”;264 and (3) require “the
NCAA and universities with athletic programs to provide detailed
information both on the financial aspects of their programs (using 
standardized accounting methods) and on the academic progress of
student-athletes.”265 
Whether all or any of these proposed requirements merit adoption by
Congress is debatable, and they may well have positive effects from a 
policy standpoint.  Capping coaches’ salaries could be a violation of
antitrust law, as discussed in the next section of this Article.266  But the
question here is how adoption of these requirements has anything to do 
with tax law.  Professor Colombo suggests the answer is that federal tax 
law be used to enforce them, and he correctly concludes that subjecting 
the NCAA, college and university athletic programs, or both to the 
UBIT for violating these requirements would be fruitless because those
institutions can easily avoid showing a profit and will avoid paying any
tax under the UBIT whether they are subject to it or not.267  Instead, he
suggests that these new rules “be structured as requirements for continued
tax exemption of the [college or university] operating the sports 
[program].”268 In other words, Colombo recommends that, if a college
or university violates these relatively minor rules that affect only its 
athletic programs, it will lose its tax exemption applicable to the entire 
institution.  This enforcement measure is basically akin to capital
punishment.  Whether his proposed requirements are justified, they
261. Id.
262. Id. at 146. 
263. Id. at 156. 
264. Id. at 157. 
265. Id. at 113. 
266. See infra Part VII. 
267. Colombo, supra note 136, at 143–44. 
268. Id. at 155. 
828
MITTEN, MUSSELMAN, BURTON FINAL PAGES (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2010 11:59 AM        
  






                







                
                                        
  
 
[VOL. 47:  779, 2010] Targeted Reform
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
hardly merit such a draconian remedy and may in addition have far-
reaching, unintended adverse consequences.
Some or all of Professor Colombo’s proposals may well be meritorious, 
but care must be taken not to change federal tax laws in such a way as to 
swing the pendulum so far in the opposite direction that educational 
institutions are unduly punished.  Enforcement measures for any new 
regulations deemed necessary should be specific and appropriate to the 
harm caused by their breach.  In addition, it would be a mistake to 
further burden and complicate federal tax laws, potentially creating 
significant costs of federal agency enforcement with new requirements 
to be met by the NCAA and its member educational institutions, when
targeted reform can more effectively achieve some of these objectives 
and others in an alternate manner. 
VII. CONDITIONAL ANTITRUST IMMUNITY AS AN EFFECTIVE
MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING TARGETED REFORMS OF
COMMERCIALIZED INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 
The commercialization of intercollegiate athletics in response to 
culturally driven market forces is a largely irreversible trend, which is
not necessarily socially undesirable because it can be used to further 
broaden university academic objectives.  Some reform, however, is
needed to ensure that the intercollegiate athletics are student-athlete-
centered and actually further the purpose of higher education, rather than
functioning as a “tail that wags the university dog” or an anchor that 
inhibits fulfillment of its academic mission.  In this Part, the Article
proposes using the carrot of federal antitrust law immunity, rather than 
swinging the stick of threatened federal taxation of athletic department
revenues, to implement targeted reforms to correct the most significant 
problems caused by the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics.
A.  Historical Application of Antitrust Law to NCAA  
Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics and    
Proposed Reform 
NCAA rules that limit or regulate the commercial aspects of
intercollegiate athletics currently are subject to the federal antitrust laws
despite the nonprofit status of the NCAA and its member colleges and 
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universities.269  The primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to preserve a
competitive marketplace to ensure that consumers receive the benefits of
economic competition.  Joint agreements in the form of NCAA rules and
regulatory activity that unreasonably restrain economic competition among
NCAA member universities or in the intercollegiate athletics market
violate antitrust law, specifically section 1 of the Sherman Act.270 
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,271 the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that NCAA rules limiting the number of 
college football games that its members could televise annually was an
output market restraint that violated the antitrust laws.272  This decision
implicitly recognized the existence of the commercial/education model 
for some aspects of intercollegiate athletics.  The Court established a
“rule of reason” framework for determining whether a challenged NCAA 
rule is reasonable and therefore legal—or unreasonable and therefore
illegal, which requires consideration and analysis of both its anticompetitive
and procompetitive effects to determine its net economic effects on
competition in the relevant market.273  The Court concluded that jointly
limiting the number of televised college football games below the level
that would be supplied in a free market responsive to consumer demand
has significant anticompetitive effects.274  This restraint did not further a
legitimate procompetitive economic objective, such as maintaining 
competitive balance among NCAA members’ football teams.275  Although 
the Court suggested the antitrust laws should be judicially construed to 
provide the NCAA with “ample latitude”276 to maintain the “revered 
tradition of amateurism in college sports”277 and to preserve the “student- 
athlete in higher education,”278 the Court ultimately ruled that collectively 
limiting the number of televised college football games did not achieve 
these objectives.279 
269. See, e.g., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1149 n.14 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(“While organized as a non-profit organization, the NCAA—and its member 
institutions—are, when presenting amateur athletics to a ticket-paying, television-buying 
public, engaged in a business venture of far greater magnitude than the vast majority of 
‘profit-making’ enterprises.”). 
270. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
271. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
272. Id. at 120. 
273. Id. at 110–13. 
274. Id. at 113. 
275. Id. at 114–15. 
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Similarly, in Law v. NCAA,280 a federal appellate court held that an 
NCAA rule limiting the yearly compensation of Division I entry-level 
basketball coaches to $16,000, which is a restraint on an input necessary
to produce intercollegiate basketball, was an antitrust violation.281 The
court found that the “obvious anticompetitive effects”282 of fixing the
cost of coaching, an input necessary to produce intercollegiate athletics,
prevented free market competition among NCAA universities for the 
services of coaches.283  In contrast to a rule “equaliz[ing] the overall
amount of money Division I schools are permitted to spend on their 
basketball programs,”284 which would be a procompetitive means of
promoting competitive balance, capping the salaries of one category of 
coaches would not achieve this objective.285  The court ruled that “cost-
cutting by itself is not a valid procompetitive justification”286 for price
fixing, although market competition would lead to higher coaching 
salaries without this restraint.287 
In contrast, courts have relied upon the “amateur/education” model of 
intercollegiate athletics to reject antitrust challenges to NCAA eligibility 
rules by student-athletes participating in highly commercialized sports, 
such as Division I FBS football and men’s basketball.  For example, in 
Banks v. NCAA,288 a federal appellate court held that the NCAA’s “no 
agent” rule and its “no draft” rule do not violate the antitrust laws.289 
The court concluded that both rules legitimately preserve the amateur
nature of intercollegiate athletics and that the no draft rule furthers the 
280. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
281. Id. at 1024. 
282. Id. at 1020. 
283. See id. at 1024. 
284. Id. at 1023. 
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1022. 
287. The coaches ultimately won a jury verdict of $22.3 million, which was 
increased to $66.9 million in mandatory treble damages.  MITTEN ET AL., supra note 13, 
at 261.  The NCAA subsequently settled the case for $54.5 million in damages and 
approximately $20 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to plaintiffs’ attorneys. Id.
288. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992). 
289. Id. at 1094.  Under the no agent rule, a student-athlete loses eligibility to
participate in all intercollegiate sports if the athlete agrees to be represented by an agent.
Id. at 1083–84.  Under the no draft rule, a student-athlete loses amateur eligibility in a 
particular sport, such as NFL football, if the athlete asks to be placed on a professional
league’s draft list for the sport. Id. at 1083. 
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procompetitive objective of maintaining “the clear line of demarcation 
between college and professional football.”290 
Other courts also have disregarded the commercialized nature of 
Division I FBS football and men’s basketball by ruling that all NCAA 
rules to maintain the “amateur” nature of intercollegiate athletics are not 
unreasonable restraints of trade.291  This body of precedent holds that 
such rules are essentially per se legal for purposes of antitrust law.292 
This judicial view appears based on the unproven assumption that the 
significant popularity and commercial success of intercollegiate athletics
are primarily attributable to this self-serving NCAA characterization, 
thereby demonstrating their responsiveness to consumer demand as 
required by antitrust law.  Thus, a broad range of NCAA rules designed 
to preserve amateurism are legal regardless of any adverse effects on 
student-athletes’ economic interests.  These rules include prohibiting any 
price competition among universities or payment of fair market wages 
for their athletic services, and not allowing student-athletes to receive
any athletics-related pecuniary benefits from nonfamily third parties.293 
In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court observed that “[t]he NCAA is 
an association of schools which compete against each other to attract 
television revenues, not to mention fans and athletes.”294  Thus, scholarly
commentary generally has been very critical of lower court cases, for 
inappropriately presuming that NCAA amateurism rules are a noncommercial 
restraint not subject to antitrust scrutiny or a predominantly procompetitive 
form of internal regulation necessary to produce intercollegiate athletics.295 
One scholar has asserted: “Courts should abandon anachronistic
precedent based on unrealistic ideals of the ‘amateur’ nature of ‘big-
time’ college athletics and develop a principled antitrust jurisprudence 
290. Id. at 1090. 
291. See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir. 1988); Gaines 
v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 748 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 
303 (D. Mass. 1975); see also Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998)
(relying on McCormack, Gaines, and Jones to support its ruling that student-athlete 
eligibility rules “are not related to the NCAA’s commercial or business activities” and 
are not subject to antitrust challenge), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). 
292. See generally MITTEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 271–72. 
293. See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–45. 
294. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984). 
295. See, e.g., C. Peter Goplerud III, Pay for Play for College Athletes: Now, More
than Ever, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1093–94 (1997); Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in 
Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 
329, 361 (2007); Matthew J. Mitten, University Price Competition for Elite Students and 
Athletes: Illusions and Realities, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 59, 70–71 (1995); Gary R. Roberts, 
The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2672–73 (1996); 
Daniel A. Rascher & Andrew D. Schwarz, Neither Reasonable nor Necessary: “Amateurism” 
in Big-Time College Sports, ANTITRUST, Spring 2000, at 51, 53. 
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more consistent with the economic realities of college sports in the
[twenty-first] century.”296 Thus, rather than relying on an outdated
amateur/education model to reach a contrary conclusion, courts should 
characterize NCAA amateurism rules as restraints on economic 
competition among universities for student-athletes’ services, which
should be subject to rigorous antitrust scrutiny under the Board of
Regents rule of reason framework.  In other words, the NCAA should be 
required to prove, as a matter of fact, that collective restraints with
anticompetitive effects are outweighed by the procompetitive effects of
maintaining academic integrity and the predominantly extracurricular
nature of intercollegiate athletics or that competitive balance among its 
member institutions that cannot be substantially achieved by less
restrictive means.297  It is very questionable whether preservation of the
“amateur” nature of intercollegiate athletics in itself is a legitimate
procompetitive justification for restraints with anticompetitive effects.298 
Because of NCAA rules prohibiting any price competition for student-
athletes’ services, universities incur artificially reduced “labor” costs to
produce sports such as Division I FBS football and men’s basketball and 
garner economic rent.  These cost savings then are used to fund socially 
desirable objectives, such as subsidizing the costs of producing female 
and male intercollegiate sports, that do not generate net revenues as well 
as undesirable ones, such as paying exorbitant annual salaries in excess
296. Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of “Big Time”
College Athletics: The Need To Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of 
Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1,
7 (2000); see also Lazaroff, supra note 295, at 356 (“[I]f courts begin to recognize that 
the academic ideal offered by the NCAA is more of a historical anachronism or a modern
fiction, they will no longer be able to justify summary dismissal of student-athlete antitrust
claims by simply relying on [NCAA v. Board of Regents] dicta that athletes must not be
paid.”). 
 297. Lazaroff, supra note 295, at 361–65; Mitten, supra note 295, at 75. 
298. Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 295, at 53 (observing that lower courts 
improperly assume it is reasonable and necessary to preserve amateurism to produce 
intercollegiate athletics, an issue not decided by the Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of 
Regents); see also Davis, supra note 90, at 322 (noting that “the invocation of
amateurism as a value critical to the operation of big-time intercollegiate athletics, may 
inhibit the necessary focus on the educational value” of sports competition sponsored by
institutions of higher education); Mitten, supra note 295, at 78 (“[A]lumni pride and 
loyalty, tradition, long-standing rivalries, national rankings, conference and national
championship tournament competition, and exciting play probably contribute to the 
public obsession with college sports more than the ‘amateur’ status of college athletes.”).
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of $1 million to head coaches in revenue-generating sports.299 In 
addition, NCAA amateurism rules have the unintended consequence of 
contributing to the athletic arms race by encouraging inefficient nonprice 
competition for student-athletes’ services.300 
Recently, two different groups of former student-athletes brought class 
action antitrust litigation against the NCAA in an effort to obtain a share 
of the revenues generated by their playing abilities and fame than 
historically has been permitted under NCAA rules.  In O’Bannon v. 
NCAA,301 the plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA’s member universities
and others’ collective refusal to permit former Division I basketball
players and FBS football players to share in the multimillion-dollar 
revenues from the sale of products incorporating their likenesses—even
after their intercollegiate athletics eligibility ended—violates the antitrust
laws.302  This case currently is pending in a California federal court, 
which has ruled that the plaintiffs’ complaint pleads sufficient facts to
establish the requisite anticompetitive effects under the rule of reason.303 
In White v. NCAA,304 a group of former Division I-A football and
Division I men’s basketball players asserted that an NCAA rule limiting 
the maximum value of their football and basketball scholarships to the
value of tuition, fees, room and board, and books—an amount alleged to
be less than the full annual cost of attending college—violates antitrust 
law.305  The complaint was carefully drafted in an effort to avoid the
NCAA’s defense that this rule is necessary to preserve the amateur
nature of intercollegiate athletics.  The court ruled that plaintiffs’ complaint
sufficiently alleged an anticompetitive agreement among NCAA member
universities to fix the economic value of their athletic scholarships 
effects,306 but this case subsequently was settled before trial.307 The
 299. Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 295, at 53–54. 
 300. Mitten, supra note 295, at 74–75; see Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 295, at 54. 
301. Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. 
CV 09-3329 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2009). 
302. Id. at 2–3.  As just one example, in 2008, the University of Florida received
approximately $77,000 in royalties from the sale of football jerseys bearing quarterback 
Tim Tebow’s widely recognized number fifteen jersey.  Fish, supra note 113. 
303. O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. C09-1967 CW, C 09-3329 CW, C 09-4882 CW,
2010 WL 445190, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
304. Notice of Class Action Settlement and Fairness Hearing, White v. NCAA, No. 
CV06-0999 VBF (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2008), available at http://www.ncaaclassac 
tion.com/settlementnotice.pdf. 
305. Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 1, White v. 
NCAA, No. CV 06-0999-RGK (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2006), available at
http://ncaaclassaction.com/deny.pdf.
306. Id. at 3–4. 
307. Notice of Class Action Settlement and Fairness Hearing, supra note 304, at 2; 
see also White v NCAA, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WC
MGLOBALCONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/ncaa/NCAA/Academics+and+Athletes/ 
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settlement terms required the NCAA to make available a total of $218 
million to Division I institutions to provide aid to current student-
athletes with financial needs, academic needs, or both; to establish a $10 
million fund to reimburse plaintiffs’ future education expenses; to permit
Division I institutions to provide student-athletes with insurance for 
sport-related injuries and year-round health insurance; and to consider
future NCAA legislation permitting multiyear student-athlete scholarships 
and financial aid through graduation to student-athletes who no longer
qualify for athletic-based aid.308 
Despite the historical judicial refusal to apply traditional antitrust law 
principles to NCAA restraints that adversely affect student-athletes’
economic interests, White and O’Bannon illustrate that the potential
recovery of mandatory treble damages and attorneys’ fees creates
significant incentives for class action antitrust litigation against the 
NCAA.  The risk of potential multimillion-dollar treble damages liability
if plaintiffs prevail on the merits of their antitrust claims creates a strong 
incentive for the NCAA to reach a monetary settlement.  Unfortunately,
this only resolves the immediate problem by making a one-time wealth
transfer that provides only short-term, limited additional economic benefits 
to some student-athletes.  A settlement does not, however, remedy the
underlying problems giving rise to student-athletes’ antitrust claims or
preclude future antitrust litigation by others.  The risk of such litigation 
may inhibit NCAA internal reform aimed at ensuring that revenues 
generated by commercialized sports more effectively further a university’s
academic mission and student-athletes’ welfare. 
Based on concerns about antitrust liability, the NCAA has been
reluctant to enact cost control legislation and, currently, is simply 
encouraging each of its member institutions to individually make 
financially responsible decisions regarding the resources allocated to its
intercollegiate athletics program and its athletics department’s
expenditures.309  Effective NCAA internal governance of commercialized
Education+and+Research/White+v+NCAA/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) (describing the 
requirements and criteria student-athletes must fulfill to receive the settlement benefits).
308. Information Related to the White Case Settlement: Summary of Settlement and 
Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA.ORG., http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/20c4
43004e0dacc5a096f01ad6fc8b25/White+settlement+FAQ+%28Revised+9.09%29.pdf?
MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=20c443004e0dacc5a096f01ad6fc8b25 (last visited
Aug. 2, 2010) (summarizing the settlement terms). 
309. See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF DIV. I INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS, supra note 44, at 12. 
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intercollegiate athletics requires uniform rules and enforcement, which 
are necessarily the product of agreements and collective decisionmaking 
among NCAA member institutions, thereby inviting antitrust challenges 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Authors propose that Congress provide the NCAA and its 
member institutions with broad or limited immunity from antitrust
liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act,310 expressly conditioned
upon the adoption and implementation of several targeted external reforms
to ensure that twenty-first century intercollegiate athletics furthers 
legitimate higher education objectives, provides student-athletes with the 
full benefits of their bargain, and enhances the likelihood they will obtain
a college education that maximizes their future career opportunities other
than playing professional sports.311  Eliminating the threat of potential
antitrust liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act would enable the 
NCAA and its member institutions to adopt internal reforms that effectively
prevent intercollegiate athletics from crossing the line between a primarily 
educational endeavor to a commercial enterprise, enhance the academic
integrity of intercollegiate athletics, promote more competitive balance 
in intercollegiate sports competition, require university athletic departments 
to operate with fiscal responsibility, and limit unbridled market competition 
for inputs such as coaches necessary to produce intercollegiate athletics.
Some commentators have suggested “a legislative solution may not be 
optimally practical or viable” to remedy antitrust issues raised by NCAA 
internal regulation and that it is “probably better for the NCAA to
address these problems and for the courts to try and resolve these
disputes on a case-by-case basis with a more enlightened and modern 
rule of reason approach.”312  Although sports-related federal legislation
310. See generally Mitten, supra note 295, at 82 (“[By providing antitrust immunity,]
Congress, representing broad political and societal perspectives, may establish the 
bounds of university cooperation required to achieve social welfare objectives that are 
not furthered by the operation of the free market.”).  Congress may want to limit the 
scope of this immunity to NCAA rules and internal regulations that reduce or eliminate 
competition among NCAA member institutions for input necessary to produce
intercollegiate athletics such as student-athletes and coaches, thereby subjecting output 
market restraints and other joint restrictions to antitrust challenge under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  The NCAA would remain subject to monopolization, 
attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize claims under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. See id. § 2 (2006). 
311. Like two antitrust scholars explain: “The historical mixing of amateur athletics 
and academics in America arises out of a socially constructed belief that athletic participation 
can be an asset to a college education.  But if the universities become only preparatory 
academies for professional sports, there is a breach of this social contract.”  Peter C.
Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-Athletes, and the NCAA: Limiting 
the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 545, 557. 
 312. Lazaroff, supra note 295, at 371. 
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is rare, Congress has provided limited antitrust immunity to other
national sports regulatory bodies when necessary to enable the achievement 
of legitimate objectives.313  However, antitrust law, which prohibits
unreasonable conduct but does not require reasonable conduct, is not 
well-suited to externally regulate NCAA internal governance of
intercollegiate athletics, particularly rules and agreements that define
this unique brand of athletic competition and the permissible scope of a 
university’s relationship with its student-athletes.314 Moreover, a
piecemeal approach by way of antitrust litigation that merely considers 
the legality of the particular challenged restraint will not effectively 
solve macro, systemic problems inherent in the production of commercialized
intercollegiate athletics by institutions of higher education.  The primary 
actual and potential problems caused by this blend of athletics and
academics are an overemphasis on winning and generating sports-related
revenues, a misallocation of scarce university resources to the athletic
department, subordination of higher education academic values to the 
forces of commercialization, and student-athletes’ inability to realize the 
educational benefits of the bargain for providing playing services.315 
313. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).  For example, the Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291, permits professional sports league clubs to pool and sell or
transfer “all or any part of the rights of such league’s member clubs in the sponsored 
telecasting of the games.”  The Act’s legislative history indicates that it is intended to
“enable the member clubs . . . to pool their separate rights in the sponsored telecasting of 
their games and to permit the league to sell the resulting package of pooled rights to a 
purchaser, such as a television network, without violating the antitrust laws.”  S. REP.
NO. 87-1087, at 1 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3042, 3042. 
314. In contrast to output market restraints, such as limits on the number of televised
college football games successfully challenged in NCAA v. Board of Regents, it is more
difficult to evaluate the economic effects of input market restraints such as the no draft
and no agent rules unsuccessfully challenged in Banks v. NCAA on consumer welfare, 
which is the primary objective of antitrust law. Compare NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (“[B]y curtailing output and blunting the ability
of member institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCCA has restricted
rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life.”), with
Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1094 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that Banks “fail[ed] to allege
an anti-competitive impact on a discernible market,” and affirming the district court’s 
dismissal for failure to state an actionable claim).
315. Some commentators characterize the primary problem and proposed remedies 
too narrowly and solely in economic terms.  See, e.g., Goplerud, supra note 295, at 1089
(advocating NCAA legislation that gives universities the unilateral discretion to pay a 
stipend up to a maximum amount to individual student-athletes participating in Division
I major revenue producing sports); Lazaroff, supra note 295, at 372 (suggesting the need 
to create “greater economic fairness” by giving student-athletes employee status, “pay-
for-play,” or both); Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of 
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B.  Proposed Conditional Antitrust Immunity and     
Potential Beneficial Effects 
The Authors recommend that the federal statute immunizing the
NCAA and its member institutions from antitrust liability under section 
1 of the Sherman Act be entitled the “Myles Brand Student-Athlete 
Education and Welfare Act” in honor of former NCAA president Myles
Brand, who died on September 16, 2009.  A philosophy professor, Brand
was the first university president to serve as NCAA president.  He was a
strong proponent of commercialized intercollegiate athletics who believed 
that sports are an integral part of higher education and an equally vigorous 
advocate for NCAA reforms designed to better integrate athletics and 
academics and to enhance student-athletes’ educational experiences and 
welfare. 
This proposed antitrust immunity would be conditioned upon certain 
requirements that the NCAA and its member institutions must satisfy to 
ensure that commercialized intercollegiate athletics are primarily an 
educational endeavor and that student-athletes in sports generating net 
revenues receive valuable educational benefits in exchange for their 
playing services.  The following are some possible requirements that 
could be imposed as conditions of our proposed antitrust immunity: 
(1) At least a four-year athletic scholarship that covers the full annual
cost of college attendance, which may be taken away only for failing to
meet minimum academic requirements, engaging in misconduct, or
voluntarily choosing not to continue playing a sport, and tuition funding 
the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 79–81 
(2006) (asserting that “grant-in-aid athletes in revenue-generating sports at Division I 
NCAA schools are ‘employee-athletes,’” which would permit them to unionize, collectively
bargain for wages and other employment benefits, and strike to further their economic
objectives).  It has been estimated that a college football player who will be an NFL draft 
choice has an average annual market value of $1.3–1.36 million to his university.  Fish,
supra note 113.  An outstanding college quarterback would have a much higher value: 
University of Florida quarterback Tim Tebow’s estimated annual worth to the school 
was at least $2.5 million. Id. But see Richard B. McKenzie & E. Thomas Sullivan, Does 
the NCAA Exploit College Athletes? An Economics and Legal Reinterpretation, 32
ANTITRUST BULL. 373, 375–76 (1987) (asserting that NCAA prohibitions on price 
competition do not artificially reduce the compensation that student-athletes would 
receive for their services below the amounts offered if competitive bidding by
universities were permissible).  Paying student-athletes cash compensation would cause 
competitive imbalances between institutions having the financial resources to do so and 
those that do not.  The payments may also violate Title IX gender equity laws unless 
such payments were made to a proportionate number of both male and female student-
athletes.  Because paying student-athletes would increase a university’s costs to produce 
intercollegiate athletics, it also may result in the reduction of athletic participation opportunities
in women’s sports and men’s nonrevenue sports. 
838
MITTEN, MUSSELMAN, BURTON FINAL PAGES (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2010 11:59 AM        
  
















     
  












   
[VOL. 47:  779, 2010] Targeted Reform
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
for a fifth or sixth year of college education if necessary to complete a
bachelor’s degree, provided the student-athlete is in good academic
standing when the student’s intercollegiate athletics ability is exhausted.316 
Providing these additional benefits likely would increase the college 
graduation rates of Division I FBS football and men’s basketball 
student-athletes, whose efforts generate most intercollegiate athletics
revenues.  According to 2009 NCAA Graduation Success Rate (GSR)
data for Division I, 79% of all student-athletes who entered college in 
2002 earned their degrees by the end of 2008 whereas the GSR for both 
Division I FBS football and men’s basketball was only 66%.317  The  
corresponding figures from Federal Graduation Rate (FGR) data
compiled by the federal government—which does not include student-
athletes who transfer out of a university in good standing or incoming 
transfer students who graduate—are a 64% graduation rate for all 
Division I student-athletes—two percentage points higher than the
general student body—but only 55% for FBS football players and 51% 
for men’s basketball players.318  Because college graduates generally 
earn more income during their working career than those who have not 
earned their degree, it is very important for student-athletes who play
football or basketball to graduate from college because of the very low 
likelihood they will earn a living playing these sports professionally.319 
316. Observing that NCAA regulations prohibit member universities from promising or
providing scholarship assistance to student-athletes who have exhausted their athletic 
eligibility, some scholars have opined:
This kind of restriction is entirely consistent with an agreement among 
colleges not to compete in providing athletes with a real opportunity to acquire
a college education.  This is only a cost control and appears to be “exploitation 
. . . by . . . commercial enterprises.”  If this is correct, such a restraint would 
seem to be unlawful and subject to antitrust challenge by any student-athlete
denied continued support for his or her education.
Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 311, at 591. 
 317. Press Release, NCAA, Graduation Rates Reach All-Time Highs (Nov. 18,
2009), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?key=/ncaa/NCAA/Media+and+Events/ 
Press+ Room/Embargoed/20091118+GSR+Press+Release. 
318. Id.
319. Rodney K. Smith & Robert D. Walker, From Inequity to Opportunity: Keeping
the Promises Made to Big-Time Intercollegiate Student-Athletes, 1 NEV. L.J. 160, 173
(2001) (“[T]he economic value of a college education, as evidenced by a degree, is well 
in excess of $500,000, in current dollars, over the working lifetime of the student-athlete, 
who graduates with a degree, as compared to the athlete who does not receive such a 
degree.”). These commentators correctly observe:
There is also some lifetime economic benefit to student-athletes who attend but 
do not graduate from a university, since employees with some higher education 
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(2) Free medical care or health insurance for all sports-related injuries 
plus extension of the injured student-athlete’s scholarship for a period of 
time equal to the time the athlete is medically unable to attend class due
to injury.  This is an important benefit because the NCAA currently
permits, but does not require, its member institutions to provide medical
care or health insurance for sports-related injuries.320  Moreover, courts
generally hold that student-athletes, including those participating in net 
revenue generating sports, are not “employees” entitled to recover worker’s
compensation benefits for intercollegiate athletics-related injuries.321 
(3) Mandatory remedial assistance and tutoring for entering student-
athletes whose indexed academic credentials are below a certain
percentile—twenty-fifth percentile, for example—for their university’s 
freshman class.  The NCAA’s Academic Progress Rate system that holds
universities accountable for their students-athletes’ collective academic 
performance and imposes penalties for deficiencies currently provides a 
strong incentive to voluntarily provide these services,322 but mandating
such assistance probably would do even more to enhance the academic
tend to generate a higher income over the course of their working lives than do
employees with only a high school education.  However, that economic benefit 
is much less than the benefit accruing to a graduate.
Id. at 184.  For further support of this observation, see Marburger & Hogshead-Makar, 
supra note 86, at 69, observing that U.S. Census data “show that at any age level, persons 
with a degree in higher education earn more than individuals with a high school education.” 
Chancellor of Vanderbilt University, Gordon Lee, now President of Ohio State University, 
made a similar reform suggestion that would give NCAA universities a strong incentive 
to ensure that student-athletes earn a degree.  Lee suggested: 
[T]he number of athletic scholarships that a school can award should be tied to 
the graduation rates of its athletes in legitimate athletic programs.  If a school 
falls below a threshold graduation rate, it should be penalized by having to
relinquish a certain number of scholarships for the next year’s entering class. 
Gordon Lee, Vanderbilt Abolishes Athletic Department, ATHLETICSCHOLARSHIPS.NET
(Sept. 2003), http://www.athleticscholarships.net/vanderbiltnews.htm. 
 320. NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS art. 16.4, § 16.4.1, reprinted in NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2009–10 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 199–200. 
321. See, e.g., Rensing v. Ind. St. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 
(Ind. 1983); Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983);
Waldrep v. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692, 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). 
322. In 2009, for the first time, the NCAA banned university sports teams— 
University of Tennessee—Chattanooga and Jacksonville State University football teams, 
and Centenary College men’s basketball team—from postseason championship competition 
for team members’ poor academic performance based on the four-year average of their 
Academic Progress Rate (APR).  David Moltz, Classroom Failure, Postseason Ban, 
INSIDE  HIGHER  ED (May 7, 2009), http://www.insidehighered.com/layout/set/print/
news/2009/05/07/ncaa.  Several other university athletic teams were penalized for low 
APRs by losing scholarships that otherwise could have been awarded to student-athletes.
Id.  On a more positive note, the overall APR for all Division I sports rose three points
from 2008 figures and the overall averages for baseball, football, and men’s basketball—
sports whose team members traditionally underachieved academically—increased more
significantly.  Id.
840
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performance of individual students-athletes most at risk of not succeeding 
academically. 
(4) The creation of a postgraduate scholarship program administered 
by the NCAA and funded by a designated percentage of the total net 
revenues generated by intercollegiate football and men’s basketball, and 
perhaps other sports, including the sales of merchandise incorporating
aspects of student-athletes’ persona, such as team jerseys with numbers
identifying individual players.  Because the collective effort of all
participating student-athletes, including those who are less prominent or 
talented, is necessary to produce these sports and contribute to an
individual player’s commercial popularity, all of the athletes should have
the opportunity to qualify for educational benefits funded by the
commercial exploitation of publicity rights.323 
There is justification for providing greater educational benefits to
student-athletes playing net revenue generating sports such as Division I 
men’s basketball and FBS football. One legal scholar observes that
student-athletes who participate in major college basketball and football
“are doing something special for their schools” by providing the university
with a vital link to alumni, bringing together diverse constituencies, and
creating contagious euphoria.324  He asserts that “[t]hose who provide
the occasions for collective euphoria are making a unique contribution to 
the [university] community and deserve to be recognized for it.”325 
In attempting to discern why graduation rates for student-athletes in 
Division I men’s basketball and FBS football historically have been
below male graduation rates for the general student body, some scholars 
suggest a plausible explanation: 
[C]oaches in men’s basketball and football at this level demand more of them,
in terms of time and energy, than athletes in other programs. While this assertion is
speculative because there is little empirical data available in this important area,
it makes sense that coaches at this level, who are better paid and are under
extreme pressure to win because profits are tied to winning programs, demand
more of their players, in order to retain their position, salary and benefits.326 
323. In this regard, collective efforts and accomplishments of all students and 
alumni contribute to university’s reputation and value of its degrees, which generally are not 
individually compensated by the university.
 324. Stanton Wheeler, Rethinking Amateurism and the NCAA, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 213, 235 (2004). 
325. Id. at 229. 
326. Smith & Walker, supra note 319, at 168.  NCAA rules limit a student-athlete’s 
required participation in in-season, athletics-related activities to a maximum of four
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They note that these student-athletes are predominantly persons of color
whose athletic abilities generate substantial revenues that fund other 
intercollegiate sports in which the participating student-athletes are not
persons of color and contend there is “a strong argument that they are 
not receiving an equitable share of the wealth they contribute to 
generating.”327 Because providing greater educational benefits to
student-athletes in net revenue-generating sports such as men’s football 
and basketball is facially gender neutral, they suggest that doing so may
not violate Title IX gender equity laws because “this is really an equal
pay for equal work claim, like that of women coaches who have 
[unsuccessfully] challenged the differential in compensation between
themselves and coaches in men’s sports.”328 
Antitrust immunity could also be conditioned upon adoption of some 
of Professor Colombo’s foregoing proposals.  Among his worthy
proposals are requiring that a certain percentage of the net revenues from
sports such as football and basketball be used to fund and expand
participation opportunities for student-athletes in sports that do not 
generate net revenues, or requiring the NCAA and its member universities
to provide detailed information concerning their athletic department
finances using standardized accounting methods.329  Some members of 
Congress may insist that any antitrust immunity be conditioned on the 
dismantling of the current Division I FBS system, which favors universities 
in Bowl Championship Series conferences, and the establishment of a
national championship playoff system in which all 120 universities with
Division I FBS football teams have an equal opportunity to participate.330 
hours per day and twenty hours per week.  Report: Players Alleges Rules Were Broken, 
ESPN.COM (last updated Aug. 30, 2009, 4:21 PM), http://sports.espn.go.co m/ncf/new
s/story?id=4431717.  A 2006 NCAA survey of 21,000 student-athletes revealed that major 
college football players voluntarily spent approximately forty-five hours per week on
athletic activities, which was more than ten hours per week more than the majority of 
other sports included in the survey. Long Hours Expected To Play College Football, 
ALLBUSINESS.COM (Sept. 6, 2009), http://www.allbusiness.com/education-training/curricula-
apprenticeships-internships/12890018-1.html.  Ohio State University linebacker Austin
Spitler stated that “we’re there from the crack of dawn till 7 or 8 o’clock at night [during 
football season].”  Doug Lesmerises, In Wake of Michigan Story, Ohio State Football 
Players Discuss Balance of Buckeyes’ Mandatory vs. Voluntary Activities, CLEVELAND.COM
(Sept. 1, 2009, 3:38 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/buckeyeblog/index.ssf/2009/09/
ohio_state_buckeyes_on_balance.html.  “If you want to be good as a team, guys are going to
be putting in way more than 20 hours a week,” Spitler said. Id.
327. Smith & Walker, supra note 319, at 167. 
328. Id. at 197. 
329. See supra text accompanying notes 262–65. 
330. On December 9, 2009, a House subcommittee passed legislation that makes it
illegal to promote a college national championship game “or make a similar
representation” unless it results from a playoff system. Subcommittee OKs College 
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Congressional antitrust immunity from section 1 of the Sherman Act
would enable the NCAA and its member universities to pursue important 
socially desirable objectives, some of which otherwise would violate the
antitrust laws.  The Law case331 currently limits NCAA member institutions’ 
collective ability to control escalating university expenditures on
intercollegiate athletics, which in recent years have increased at a rate
two to three times more than other higher education expenditures and
increasingly require universities to financially subsidize their athletic 
departments.332  Given the shield of antitrust immunity, the NCAA could 
adopt legislation to curb the existing athletic arms race by imposing
annual or multiyear per sport aggregate spending caps or limits on
certain expenditures—coaches’ salaries—for the different levels of
intercollegiate athletics competition.333  In turn, these cost savings could 
be used to maintain or increase intercollegiate athletics participation 
opportunities in women’s sports and men’s nonrevenue sports.334 
Football Playoff Bill, ESPN.COM (last updated Dec. 10, 2009, 9:46 AM), http://sports. 
espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=4727426. 
331. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998); see supra text 
accompanying notes 280–87. 
332. See supra notes 103–09 and accompanying text. 
333. In June 2010, although acknowledging that the antitrust laws prohibit NCAA 
member institutions from collectively limiting coaches’ salaries, the Knight Commission 
on Intercollegiate Athletics observed that obtaining “an exemption from the antitrust 
laws for any reason is a complicated, time-consuming, and expensive endeavor that is by
no means assured of success,” and recommended “that an exemption not be sought, at 
least at this time.”  KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, RESTORING THE
BALANCE: DOLLARS, VALUES, AND THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE SPORTS 18 (2010), available 
at http://www.knightcommission.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= 
503&Itemid=166.  Proposing that “[r]eform of collegiate athletics financing can and 
must be more immediate and comprehensive than any reform provided through a limited
and specific exemption secured through the legislative process,” the Commission
recommended “colleges and universities should consider coaches’ compensation in the 
context of the academic institutions that employ them,” and that “[t]heir compensation 
should reflect the values of the amateur athletics programs that they oversee, not the 
values of professional sports teams whose major objectives are winning championships 
and earning profits.”  Id.  Although this a laudable and appropriate objective, the Authors 
believe that existing market forces provide individual NCAA member institutions with a 
strong economic disincentive to do so and that the athletic arms race will continue
without an antitrust exemption permitting collective cost constraints. 
334. Based on their evaluation of empirical evidence and economic analysis, Professors
Marburger and Hogshead-Makar explain: 
Because the “marginal benefit” of a dollar spent on football and men’s 
basketball at the Division I (especially I-A) level exceeds the marginal benefit 
of the same sports at Divisions II and III, Division I athletic directors have an 
economic incentive to dedicate a greater proportion of the budget to these 
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Legend has it that King Canute I was the ancient monarch who stood 
on the ocean shore and commanded the tide not to come in.  Not 
surprisingly, his effort failed.  Similarly, the commercialization of 
intercollegiate athletics is an inevitable market response to our nation’s 
strong cultural passion for sports competition.  It is equally inevitable 
that college and university leaders would seek to use intercollegiate
athletics as a means of achieving other legitimate institutional objectives.
Because intercollegiate athletics is an integral part of institutions of 
higher education, the revenues generated by university athletic departments
should continue to be exempt from federal taxation.  It is, however, 
necessary to ensure that the increasing commercialization of intercollegiate
athletics does not conflict with the academic missions of universities or
interfere with student-athletes’ educational opportunities.  The Authors’
proposed solution is that Congress should provide the NCAA and its 
member universities with a limited exemption from the federal antitrust 
laws as a means of implementing targeted reforms to ensure that
intercollegiate athletics are primarily an educational endeavor rather than
commercialized quasi-professional sports. 
sports.  The evidence clearly supports this contention.  In fact, the largest 
allocation of resources in favor of football and men’s basketball occurs at the 
Division I-A level, where significant profits in these sports serve as the norm.
 . . . . 
. . . To allow for unbridled growth in their budgets (driven primarily by the 
prisoner’s dilemma), athletic directors resort to exempting football and men’s 
basketball from budgetary considerations and cut men’s nonrevenue sports as a
means to comply with Title IX.
. . . As long as football and men’s basketball budgets are essentially
exempted from budgetary restraints, Title IX proportionality burdens are shifted to
the nonrevenue sports. . . .  [T]he net decrease in men’s nonrevenue sports occurred
only at the Division I level despite the fact that football and men’s basketball 
are frequently in a position to cross-subsidize the nonrevenue sports.  At the
Division III level, where the expenditures per participant are substantially more
equal between “revenue” and nonrevenue sports, and also between men’s and 
women’s sports in general, the net change in the number of men’s sports is positive. 
Marburger & Hogshead-Makar, supra note 86, at 92–93 (internal citations omitted). 
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